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vABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this research paper is to determine the feasibility of supporting 
United States Marine Corps Engineering Equipment operation and maintenance 
requirements through a Private Finance Initiative.  The reason for seeking this 
comparison is that the Marine Corps has realized that the current operating structure is 
not cost effective and that resources are used up that could be better spent elsewhere.  
This study will first evaluate what a PFI is and how it is structured to operate, using 
information provided by the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, which is considering 
a PFI solution to its engineer equipment needs.  The UK Ministry of Defense has used 
PFI’s extensively over the past decade to meet a variety of service support requirements.  
Next, the thesis will analyze the mission, requirements, operations, and structure of the 
USMC engineer community to determine what functions the Marine Corps does well and 
which are core to its business. With this information, the thesis will propose a draft PFI 
structure that would meet all USMC engineer equipment operation and maintenance 
needs.  The draft PFI will attempt to address all of the particular requirements that the 
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The 1990’s saw a decrease in the budget for the Department of Defense (DOD) as 
well as a reduction in manpower, a sharp contrast to the defense-spending boom of the 
1980’s.  The reason for the decrease was the end of the cold war.  The American taxpayer 
and policy makers expected a peace dividend that could address other concerns facing the 
nation.  The 1990’s however, saw not a decrease in the need for the military, but rather an 
increase in operational requirements to deal with a plethora of conflicts and contingencies 
around the world that posed new challenges to the DOD.  These increased requirements 
put tremendous pressures on the DOD and strained its resources, both monetary and 
manpower.  The New World Order it seemed was going to pose new challenges.   
As a result, the DOD began to look for ways and areas where it could cut costs 
and increase efficiencies.  There was a clear realization within the DOD that the military 
was lagging behind the private sector in its business and operational processes, especially 
in the area of logistics.  This realization led to a number of reform attempts within each 
branch of the DOD.  The reforms attempted to adapt best business practices to DOD 
processes and operations, especially those aimed at increasing sustainability and reducing 
total cost ownership (TCO).   
The DOD outlined its new vision for dealing with the New World Order 
challenges in the Joint Vision 2010 document and subsequently the Joint Vision 2020.  
These documents offered a guide of how the DOD would have to transform itself to meet 
the challenges of the new century.  They offered not only a roadmap to the transformation 
of the war fighter component, but also the necessary transformation of the logistics 
processes that would enable the services to operate much more effectively and efficiently 
than in the past.  In the year 2000, DOD outlined its adoption of Evolutionary Acquisition 
(EA) philosophy, through its DOD 5000 series.  It stated, “Evolutionary acquisition 
strategies shall be the preferred approach to satisfying operational needs”1. 
                                                 
1 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, pp.4, 2000. 
2At the same time that the DOD was seeking to transform itself, the Federal 
Government procurement process was also being transformed so that the government 
could adopt more effective commercial practices and take advantage of the advanced 
technologies available in the commercial sector.  Following the defense boom of the 
1980’s, the federal procurement process had become to be seen as wasteful, full of fraud 
and abuse and unresponsive to the needs of the war fighter.  The federal government 
acquisition process, like the DOD was had come to be seen as lagging behind the private 
sector.  As a result, two major pieces of legislation where passed in the 1990’s to help 
increase the efficiency and responsiveness of the federal government acquisition process.  
These were: the Federal Acquisition and Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 and the 
Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996.  These laws introduced the “use of credit cards, electronic 
contracting, increased purchase of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) instead of “mil-
spec” commodities and a relaxation or elimination of many rules.2”      
These laws in addition to increased emphasis on outsourcing from executive 
branch directives such as Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 
opened the way to many reforms.  Reforms that have sough to increase the efficiency on 
how the DOD does business by using products, services, and processes from the private 
sector.  This increase realization that the military can learn from the private sector and 
use it to fulfill many of its requirements has opened the door to using it to fulfill many 
DOD needs.  Initially, the focus was on using commercial off the shelf (COTS) and best 
business practices.  However, it was soon realized that the private sector itself could be 
used to fulfill all military requirements directly.  This led to a wave of outsourcing 
initiatives that sought to use the private sector to cut cost, improve responsiveness, and to 
free up military personnel for military tasks.  While initially the outsourcing was limited 
to non-military tasks such as landscaping or messing facilities, it has over time evolved to 
include tasks that directly support military operations such as maintenance or security 
functions.   
This move towards outsourcing what was once considered as inherently 
governmental functions has occurred through a variety of Public Private Partnerships 
                                                 
2 Pegnato, J.A.,  “Assessing Federal Procurement Reform: Has the procurement Pendulum Stopped 
Swinging?,” Journal of Public Procurement, Volume 3, Issue 2. p.147. 2003.  
3(PPP) arrangements that seek to take advantage of private sector efficiencies.  The scope 
of the PPP being used over time has grown resulting in an increased reliance of the 
military on the private sector.  This reliance has forced the DOD to deal with the issue of 
having contractors on the battlefield and the implications that this has on policy and the 
rules of war.  In addition, by relying on the private sector the DOD limits its own options 
and ability to change because most PPP are long term commitments by both parties and 
they are difficult to stop or reverse once they are in motion.  Despite these issues, today, 
all of the services are pushing forward varying PPP as a means to save costs, increase 
responsiveness, and to achieve their transformation to the force outlined in Joint Vision 
2020.  
In this setting, the United Stated Marine Corps (USMC) has been experimenting 
how to achieve its transformation, to become the future war fighting force outlined in 
Joint Vision 2010 and 2020.  In particular, the Logistics community of the USMC has 
spent the last decade attempting to evolve its logistics processes to meet the challenges of 
the future.  Its three primary logistics commands, Installation and Logistics Department 
(I&L), MARCORSYSCOM (Marine Corps System Command), and the recently formed 
MARCOMLOGCOM (Marine Corps Logistics Command) have undertaken numerous 
initiatives and experiments in its attempt to modernize and improve the USMC logistics 
processes and operations.  A particular method that all three USMC logistics commands 
are pursuing is PPP as a means to increase efficiency and responsiveness. 
The purpose of this thesis will be to analyze the applicability of a particular PPP 
for the USMC that will permit the outsourcing of its engineering equipment 
requirements.  The particular PPP will be the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) concept 
used by the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MOD), who has used them to 
meet a variety of needs over the past decade.  The UK MOD is currently considering a 
bid to outsource its engineer equipment requirements to the private sector via a PFI 
arrangement3.    
The interested agency of this topic is the Engineer System (ES) section within the 
Ground Transportation Equipment Section (GTES) of MARCORSYSCOM, which is 
                                                 
3 Colby, I. RE: PRIVATE FINANCE INITIATIVE INFORMATION REQUEST.  Available E-mail 
from EVPWFM@dpa.mod.uk. 9 September 2003. 
4looking for an analysis of PFI applicability to meet USMC engineering equipment4.  
Another thesis5, June 2003, concluded that the USMC had excess engineering equipment 
on hand, and that there are cost benefits that can be achieved through an outsourcing 
solution6.   
 
B. PURPOSE 
This thesis will investigate the feasibility of using a PFI to meet USMC engineer 
equipment requirements.  Specifically, the intent is to determine how such a PFI should 
be structured to meet USMC engineer equipment needs and the particular requirements 
that it should address.  The proposed PFI would need to meet both the USMC garrison 
and expeditionary engineer equipment requirements.  This concept would offer engineer 
planners a flexible template that can serve as a planning document to decide whether 
form an Integrated Product Team (IPT) to look assess this concept further.  
 
C. SCOPE 
The scope of this project is to provide MARCORSYSCOM with 
recommendations related to the following three objectives: 
• Determine if a PFI form of PPP is a viable alternative to meeting USMC 
engineer equipment needs.  
• Outline how a proposed PFI solution would work. 
• Outline the contract requirements that MARCORSYSCOM would need to 
address in a proposed PFI solution. 
This analysis will first define the structure of a PFI to define what it is, how it 
operates, how it is structured to support services and requirements.  It will examine key 
aspects of a PFI, to include its potential benefits and associated risks; it will also explain 
how it differs from other outsourcing options currently being used by the DOD.  The 
                                                 
4 Michael J. Farley.  THESIS TOPIC.  Available E-mail from FarleyMJ@mcsc.usmc.mil. 9 May 2003. 
5 Blaxton, A.C., Fay, M.J., Hansen, C.M., Zuchristian, C.M., An Analysis of USMC Heavy 
Construction Equipment (HCE) Requirements.  MBA Professional Report, Naval Post Graduate School, 
Monterey, California, June 2003. 
6 Ibid 
5model of the PFI considered in this thesis will be the one used throughout the past decade 
by the UK MOD; one of the many PPP arrangements that they have used to meet a 
variety of their equipment and services requirements both within country and throughout 
the world.  A decade ago, the UK MOD found itself in a similar position to that which the 
DOD faces today: increasing commitments and falling resources.  The UK MOD is 
currently analyzing a PFI project designed to meet all of their engineer equipment 
requirements.  They are currently deciding between using a PFI or their current in house 
alternative.  A decision is expected early in 2004.   
Next, the thesis will describe USMC engineer equipment requirements in terms of 
supporting structure, maintenance processes, life cycle management, missions and 
capabilities, and emerging concepts.  The objective is to define what the actual USMC 
requirements are in each of these areas to ensure that they can be addressed in a proposed 
PFI.  It will be determined what are the USMC core competencies (those things it either 
does well or needs to do in-house) and were there is room for improvement.  Equipment 
requirements will be addressed in terms of the amount that is needed to meet day to day-
operational requirements in normal peacetime condition and those that are required to 
meet contingency operations.  Capability requirements will be defined in terms of what 
the USMC needs the equipment for in terms of missions, what those missions are, and 
how they contribute toward the USMC accomplishing its mission. 
Once a PFI has been thoroughly defined and USMC engineer requirements 
determined, the analysis will attempt to determine if a PFI is a viable alternative.  It is the 
intent of this thesis to propose a PFI solution that is structure to meet USMC engineer 
requirements.  It is also important to identify all of the particular capability and 
contractual requirements that the USMC will need to address in a proposed PFI.  The 
objective is not to find specific solutions but rather to identify the salient issues and 
potential problems associated with each requirement.  For some, the private sector 





We will analyze information provided by the UK MOD on their experience with 
PFI over the past ten years and with the requirements they have outlined for their current 
proposed PFI.  There was also a literature review that covered DOD acquisition and 
procurement reform reports, General Accounting Officer (GAO) reports, UK government 
resources, USMC and DOD doctrinal publications, previous graduate-level thesis, web 
resources, contacts with private industry, inquiry with engineer equipment units within 
the USMC, and Manpower information was gathered from Manpower and Reserve 
Affairs (M&RA). 
Next, is an analysis of USMC engineer community.  Topics covered include the 
current organizational structure, the support infrastructure, manpower and equipment 
needs, as well as maintenance processes, life cycle management, missions and 
capabilities, and emerging concepts within the community.  
Once USMC engineer requirements are analyzed, a PFI solution is proposed, 
which addresses all of the relevant requirements.  The intent of that section is to 
determine the feasibility of the PFI concept to meet USMC engineer equipment needs.   
Finally, findings, conclusions, and recommendations to MARCORSYSCOM are 
addressed. 
 
E. REPORT ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows:  Chapter II analyzes what a PFI 
is and how it is intended to operate.  The basis for the chapter is the experience that the 
UK MOD has had with PFI.  Chapter III analyzes the USMC engineer community and its 
requirements.  Chapter IV outlines a proposed PFI solution that meets USMC engineer 
equipment needs as well as all of the capabilities and contractual requirements that it 




7II. WHAT A PFI IS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI), a form of PPP was a concept developed in United 
Kingdom (UK) and initially launched in 1992.  “Its aim is to bring the private sector 
more directly into the provision of public services” while “exploiting private sector 
management, commercial and creative skill.7”  In the ensuing decade, the PFI concept 
has been widely used in the UK for assets and services like buildings, transport 
infrastructure, information systems, vehicle and equipment maintenance, and training. 
A PFI is an arrangement designed to “increase the involvement of the private 
sector in the provision of public services”8 by providing an incentive to the private sector 
to provide a product or service that the public sector then agrees to purchase.  In this 
manner, the private sector Designs, Builds, Finances, and Operates (DSFO) the service 
for the government.  A PFI is defined as a form of PPP arrangement that is  
about creating a structure in which improved Value For Money (VFM) is 
achieved through private sector innovation and management skills in order 
to deliver performance improvement and efficiency savings9.  Bidders in 
PFI competitions are therefore encouraged to find the best cost-effective 
solution and are not restricted to a single pre-determined option. This will 
normally mean that bidders come forward with different technical 
solutions for the provision of the assets required for service delivery.10   
However, because “the significant size of many PFI projects, it will often be 
necessary to involve a wide range of interests within the authority to establish a corporate 
approach to the project from the beginning11.”  In the United States, this can include 
Congress, other branches of the DOD, private sector interest, public opinion, and other 
                                                 
7 Chancellor of the Exchequer, Private Opportunity, Public Benefit: Progressing the Private Finance 
Initiative, pp. 1, Her Majesty’s Treasury, November 1995.  
8 Ibid, pp.2. 
9 Defense Logistics Organization, Private Involvement Sector Handbook, pp. 4, Defense Logistics 
Organization, Ensleigh, Bath, UK., July 2002. 
10 The Scottish Office, Planning Advice Note PAN 55: The Private Finance Initiative and The 
Planning Process. http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library/pan/pfip-00.htm, November 2003. 
11 Ibid. 
8Federal Agencies.  Something that is not unusual for other large projects within the DOD.  
PFI characteristics include: 
• They are long-term contracts, up to 30 years, which must deliver benefits 
to both parties. 
• They entail a joint approach to establishing common objectives, problem 
identification and solution with incentives for both parties to deliver 
ongoing improvements and savings.  
• They require both parties to be transparent (as far as both parties are able). 
• They must operate in a culture that embraces change and develops mutual 
trust. 
• They need clear lines of communication and levels of delegated authority. 
• They often require a lengthy negotiating and approvals process. 
• They are used when in house bids are found not be cost effective or 
efficient (UK MOD standard12). 
 
B. HOW IT DIFFERS FROM OTHER PRIVATIZATION PROJECTS 
PFI’s  
differs from privatization in that the public sector retains a substantial role 
in the PFI projects, either as the main purchaser of the services provided or 
as an essential enabler of the project.  It differs from contracting out in that 
the private sector is involved as a provider of the capital asset as well as a 
provider of services13.   
The attractiveness of the concept is that it promises to provide a better service to 
the public at lower cost and that the risk is placed on the private sector.   
 
C. TYPES OF PFI 
There are three main types of PFI projects, although each has many deviations in 
the manner in which they can be implemented.   
 
                                                 
12 United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, “PFI Guidelines: Procurement Issues General.” 
www.mod.uk/business/ppp/guidelines/general, November 2003  
13 Chancellor of the Exchequer, Private Opportunity, Public Benefit: Progressing the Private Finance 
Initiative, pp. 2, Her Majesty’s Treasury, November 1995. 
91. Financially Freestanding Projects 
Defined as “where the private sector undertakes the project on the basis that costs 
will be recovered entirely through charges to the final user14”.  In this case, the final user 
is usually the public who pays for the service such as for toll bridges, municipal public 
parking, and ferry services.  The public sectors (government) role is mainly involved in 
the regulatory and approval process for such projects.      
2. Services Sold to the Public Sector 
Defined as “where the cost of the project is met wholly or mainly by charges from 
the private sector service provider to the public sector.15”  The private sector assumes all 
of the risks of providing the service.  In this case the public sector buys the service.  
Examples of such a system include privately operated prisons or hospitals.  
3. Joint Ventures  
Joint Ventures are defined as “where the cost of the project is met partly from 
public funds and partly from other sources of income, with overall control of the project 
resting with the private sector.16”   
An example of such an arrangement would be the DOD Residential Communities 
Initiative (RCI) which is a joint venture between the services and a private sector 
company to provide military housing on base. 
 
D. WHY CONSIDER A PFI 
The main reason for looking at outsourcing options is, for a number of services 
the public sector is not as efficient as the private sector.  The private sector uses 
incentives to achieve or exceed the required performance.  On the other hand, “in house 
provisions for civil servants are neither rewarded for good performance nor penalized for 
poor performance.17”   
                                                 
14 Ibid, pp. 1. 
15 Ibid, pp. 2. 
16 Ibid, pp.2. 
17 Palmer, Keith, Chairman of the Cambridge Economic Policy Associates LTD, Institute for Public 
Policy Research Commission on Public Private Partnerships, Contract Issues and Financing in PPP/PFI 
(Do we need the ‘F’ in ‘DBFO’ Projects), pp. 3, Cambridge Economic Policy Associates LTD, 2000. 
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For the Marine Corps, PFI offers the possibility of increased efficiencies at lower 
costs.  The utilization of equipment is well below commercial standards because there is 
too equipment much to meet daily needs.  Also, because of continuous need to rotate 
personnel, the USMC is not as efficient in maintenance tasks as the private sector.  
Finally, changing rules and regulations governing civil service make it hard to quickly 
adjust to changing needs and requirements.  These factors coupled with increased 
requirements placed on a reduced military force have forced the USMC to look at ways 
to increase efficiencies through such things as a private finance initiative. 
 
E. POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES OF PFI TO THE UK GOVERNMENT 
• Increased quality of service and responsiveness at a lower cost.  The private 
sector is better at allocating resources to needs.  It is hoped that through the 
private sector, better service will be achieved because either poor performance 
or potential competition can cause a firm to lose business opportunities.  For 
the USMC this can mean increasing readiness or maintaining readiness with 
fewer resources dedicated to the maintenance of equipment.   
• “Greater flexibility in project planning”.18  The government acquisition 
process makes it difficult to quickly adjust requirements in terms of buying 
additional equipment to meet contingency needs.  In these cases, funds are 
authorized on short notice to meet these needs through outsourcing options at 
a considerable expense.  The private sector’s flexibility allows for short notice 
changes of direction unlike with the public sector19.   
• Better incentives to perform.  The profit motive is a main driver in the private 
sector.  Under a PFI, a potential contractor would have strong incentives to 
operate in a manner that would maximize its profit, such as agreeing to 
provide the service at lower cost than the government in-house option and the 
incentive of receiving a share of any savings below government operating 
costs.                                                  
18 United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, “PFI Guidelines: Procurement Issues General.” 
www.mod.uk/business/ppp/guidelines/general, November 2003 
19Greenway, Mike,  “A Joint Up Response to PFI.” 
www.copybook.com/publications/article.asp?pubID=15&catID=248&artID=466. November 2003. 
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• Generation of third party revenues20.  Contractors can gain an additional 
financial incentive by being allowed to sell spare capacity to other private or 
public sector customers, which would provide additional revenue.  There 
would of course be provisions stipulating the need to meet government surge 
requirements, which depending on the equipment or service could be easy or 
hard. 
• Allows the public sector to concentrate on core tasks or those functions 
classified as inherently governmental in nature.  For the USMC this can be 
defined as the operation of engineer equipment in support of military 
operations and performing their immediate maintenance of equipment in 
forward areas.  More complicated depot level maintenance tasks can then be 
left to contractors in a rear area facility. 
• Transfer of risk to the private sector.  Because the private sector undertakes 
the capital outlay, programs can be brought on-line quicker than with 
conventional procurement.  Through a PFI type structure, the private sector 
would assume the risk of meeting government requirements at predetermined 
cost rates.  
 
F.   UK MOD WORKER PROVISIONS 
Under certain provision, employees of the private firm could be transformed into 
employees of the Armed Services to meet certain operational requirements.21  The UK 
MOD has made this a part of some of their PFI contracts.  Contractors on the battlefield 
become part of the sponsored reserves22 in time of conflict.  Sponsored reserves operate 
as members of the armed services in times of conflict.   
                                                 
20 Ibid 
 
21 Speller, John, “Private Sector May Provide Front Line Tank Transporter.”   
http://213.38.88.195/coi/coipress.nsf/0/44b28936d7269a6e802566db005a51ea?OpenDocument.  November 
2003.  
22 Hartley, Keith, “Military Outsourcing Experience.”, 
http://www.york.ac.uk/depts/econ/rc/outsourcing.pdf.  November 2003.  
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The UK MOD defines sponsored reserves as23 
a service normally provided in peacetime by contractor staff is provided 
on operations by staff drawn from the contractor's workforce who are 
reservist members of the Armed Forces. The SR concept envisages letting 
contracts for services on condition that the contractor maintains in his 
workforce an agreed element who have volunteered to become members 
of a reserve force.  The Sponsored Reserve (SR) concept has been 
identified as a means by which support services to the Armed Forces could 
be performed effectively and cost-effectively by contractors so allowing 
regular Servicemen and women to focus on core military activities and 
ensure maximum value for money from the Defense Budget. 
Currently the DOD already has contractors that operate in the battlefield 
environments in support of military operations.   While contractors support has been a 
success, the DOD doesn’t have any regulations that address contractor operations in 
support of deployed forces.  A recent GAO report recommended that the DOD developed 
wide guidance that24: 
• Establish baseline policies for the use of contractors to support deployed 
forces 
• Delineate the roles and responsibilities of commanders regarding the  
management and oversight of contractors that support deployed forces. 
• Integrate other guidance and doctrine that may affect DOD responsibilities to 
contractors in deployed locations into a single document to assure that 
commanders are aware of all applicable policies. 
 
G. UK MOD TRANSFER AND MITIGATION OF RISK  
The transfer of risk comes in the form of the incentive for the private sector to 
provide the service with the greatest efficiency (in order to maximize their profit 
potential).  In addition, the private sector is better able to meet fluctuations in demand by 
quickly expanding or reducing capacity; in stark contrast, the public sector’s whose civil 
service rules make it hard to adapt quickly to changes in demand. Simply, the private 
                                                 
23 United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, “PFI Guidelines: Procurement Issues General.” 
http://www.mod.uk/business/ppp/reserves.htm, November 2003 
24 General Accounting Office, Military Operations: Contractors Vital Services to Deployed Forces 
but are no Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans.  June 2003. 
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sector has “better incentives to perform25”.  The following types of risks are those that 
can be transferred to the private sector under a PFI.26 
1. Design and Construction Risk (To Cost and Time)   
PFI’s can be complex because of the large uncertainty in the requirement they 
address.  This means that implementing a PFI that addresses all potential requirements 
can be time consuming and expensive.  These requirements are risk factors in them 
selves; once a considerable amount of effort and resources have been put into the process, 
it could be hard to stop or reverse if it proves unsuccessful.  The monetary cost of failing 
to meet the requirement will primarily fall on the contractor, but the government can be 
affected as well by delays. 
To minimize design and construction risks, it is important that the public sector 
outline a service requirement such as an availability rate to the private sector, “not an 
asset or equipment requirement”27.  This gives the private sector maximum flexibility in 
designing and constructing a structure that will meet the requirement.   
2. Commissioning and Operating Risks28 (Including Maintenance)   
Will the contractor be able to support a complex PFI arrangement during the 
performance phase?  This can be a real problem, because once the PFI is implemented, 
the contractor will be expected to meet operating cost and availability requirements that 
might be hard to maintain in a changing environment.  For example, if oil prices rise 
resulting in increased transportation costs.   
Building flexibility into the PFI schedule can provide some protection for the 
contractor, with increased risk for the government by providing a mechanism to cover 
increase cost. Yet this flexibility is important to ensure that the contractor will be able to 
continue to meet its obligations in an uncertain environment.  To protect its interest, the 
government can stipulate clauses that any costs adjustments will not result in changes to 
the profit structure.                                                   
25 Chancellor of the Exchequer, Private Opportunity, Public Benefit: Progressing the Private Finance 
Initiative, pp. 3, Her Majesty’s Treasury, November 1995. 
26 Ibid,  pp.13.  
27 United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, “PFI Guidelines: Procurement Issues General.” 
www.mod.uk/business/ppp/guidelines/general, November 2003 
28 Chancellor of the Exchequer, Private Opportunity, Public Benefit: Progressing the Private Finance 
Initiative, pp. 13, Her Majesty’s Treasury, November 1995. 
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3. Demand (or Volume/Usage) Risks   
If the service or equipment is unique to the government, there is a risk that the 
government will not be able to meet the demand requirement it in the PFI arrangement.  
In this case, the contractor can lose revenue.  This can place contractor finances in 
jeopardy, forcing the government to increase expenditure in order to maintain the 
contractor’s position. 
4. Residual Value Risks   
What value will assets have at the end of the contract term and how will the value 
be accounted for?  Will assets be returned to either the contractor or the government and 
can a fair valuation be achieved in the present.  These costs are subjective and can vary 
widely depending on the usage of the equipment, obsolescence, or future needs.  Again, 
this presents risk to both the contractor and the government that cannot be fairly 
evaluated in the present, but a flexible arrangement must be put in place to do so in the 
future. The recent Air Force tanker deal, which has been heavily scrutinized by congress, 
can attest to this risk.  Small differences on the residual value placed on the aircraft can 
change the net present value of the deal in favor of purchasing instead of leasing29.   
5. Fair Valuation of Government Resources in a Transfer   
If the government transfers assets to the contractor, what value will be placed on 
them and how will this be achieved?  The government has probably spent considerable 
resources on the acquisition and maintenance of equipment.   Commercial valuation 
models might not be fair or accurate, considering that the government might use the 
assets differently.  Consequently there will probably be a need to establish a new matrix 
that places a fair value on the equipment.  The UK MOD’s PFI approach proposes the use 
of using fair market value obtained through a survey of all equipment and infrastructure.  
As a general rule, methods that it uses to obtain transfer value include30: 
• Market value where comparators or independent expert valuation are readily 
available. 
                                                 
29 Government Accounting Officer, Military Aircraft: Observations on the Proposed Lease of Aerial 
Refueling Aircraft by the Air Force, pp.17,  September 2003.  
30 United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, “PFI Guidelines: Procurement Issues General.” 
www.mod.uk/business/ppp/guidelines/general, November 2003 
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• Establishing the transfer value within the original competition, which could 
include an incentive on the first supplier to refresh and improve assets over 
the initial contract period. 
• Optimized "deprival" value based on the difference between the net present 
cost of providing the service by using the current asset, and the net present 
cost of the best alternative method of meeting the service without the benefit 
of using the particular asset. 
• Potential suppliers could be invited to bid for the residual value as part of 
tendering for the follow on contract in cases where the future revenue streams 
are understood so that bidders can place a value on the cash flow.  
6. Technology/Obsolescence Risks   
This risk refers to the fact that “the assets will cease to be the technically best way 
of delivering services during the life of the contract31”.  Will the government have to pay 
for new technology or will the contractor have to absorb the costs?  Will the government 
want to use new technologies or will the contractor want to retain old technologies to 
reduce costs?  There are risks to both parties that likely cannot be addressed until the 
problem arises.  
7. Regulation Risks   
Today, PFI’s are possible because of relaxed government regulations.  PFI’s are 
themselves a flexible contractual arrangement built on trust between the public and 
private sector.  Should government regulations become more restrictive in the future 
because of potential abuses or perceptions of the same, this could pose a major risk for 
both the government and the contractor that cannot be discounted entirely.  
United States Federal Government is no exception to the regulatory risks, “since 
the Revolutionary War, the federal procurement system has oscillated between two 
extremes32”.  On the one hand, there has been the need to maintain accountability by 
implementing restrictive rules and regulations governing procurement.  On the opposite 
                                                 
31 Chancellor of the Exchequer, Private Opportunity, Public Benefit: Progressing the Private Finance 
Initiative, pp. 19, Her Majesty’s Treasury, November 1995. 
32 Pegnato, J.A., “Assessing Federal Procurement Reform: Has the procurement pendulum stopped 
swinging,” Journal of Public Procurement, Vol 3, Issue 2, pp. 146, 2003. 
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extreme, the government has relaxed rules to allow for greater responsiveness from the 
procurement system, mainly in times of national emergency.   
8. Personnel Issues   
If the Government transfers equipment or services to a contractor via a PFI, what 
happens to the associated government personnel that used to the job?  Civil service rules 
and regulations usually restrict personnel reductions.  Not to mention that civil service 
jobs have strong political backing that can block attempts at reform or change.  If civil 
service employees are applied in the PFI, the contractor could be forced to operate at a 
non-optimum point.  This can decrease profits or force the government to pay a higher 
fee for the service or equipment (which defeats the original purpose of seeking a PFI 
solution in the first place).33 
9. Default Risk 
The contractors may default and go bankrupt, and be less able to respond to 
emergencies34.  Low bids can be used to buy in and because of the complexity of PFI 
contracts, and end up costing more forcing the government to increase its costs to support 
to service provider.  This consideration must be built carefully into the source selection 
and evaluation process. 
10. Changing Requirements Risk 
Requirements may change substantially and the PFI may need to be modified.  
This modification could add to costs upsetting the initial cost benefit analysis that favored 
the PFI.  Changes are sure to happen in a PFI type arrangement.  This is a very real risk.   
It is virtually impossible to prepare a contract that covers all future contingencies, 
changes in a PFI structure may well be a necessity. 
 
H.   UK MOD VALUE FOR MONEY (VFM)35 
The UK MOD uses the term Value for Money which is the same as the DOD’s 
Net Present Value (NPV) to determine whether or not to use a PFI for a project.  If the 
                                                 
33 United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, “PFI Guidelines: Procurement Issues General.” 
www.mod.uk/business/ppp/guidelines/general, November 2003 
34 Hartley, Keith, “Military Outsourcing Experience.”, 
http://www.york.ac.uk/depts/econ/rc/outsourcing.pdf.  November 2003. 
35 Chancellor of the Exchequer, Private Opportunity, Public Benefit: Progressing the Private Finance 
Initiative, pp. 17, Her Majesty’s Treasury, November 1995. 
17
value for money is lower than the government option, then the project can be accepted36.  
It defines it as “the optimum combination of whole life costs and benefits37”.  It outlines 
three VFM decisions that need to be taken38: 
• Whether to proceed with the project. 
• Whether to proceed using PFI or traditional procurement route. 
• What supplier to select to provide the asset/service. 
The UK MOD’s reason for using PFI is that, 
Through PFI, the Government is committed to seeking value for money by 
using private sector management expertise, innovation and capital 
investment in the delivery of services to the public sector. PFI involves the 
private sector in creating or buying a new asset or assets and then selling a 
range of services based on those assets to the MOD for an agreed cost over 
an agreed period of time39. 
Through the use of PFI, the UK MOD intends to obtain increased value (better 
service at lower costs) through40. 
• Focusing on the core task of delivering operational capability. 
• Providing greater flexibility in planning our projects and our forward budget. 
• Improving the quality of services by making best use of commercial expertise. 
• Improving opportunities to generate third party revenue - sharing the costs 
with other customers - where appropriate. 
Appendix A outlines the approaches that the UK MOD’s uses to achieve 
improved value for money.  
 
 
                                                 
36 United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, “The Private Finance Initiative.” 
http://www.mod.uk/business/ppp/guidelines/financial.htm. November 2003. 
37Ibid, pp. 17. 
38 Ibid, pp.17. 
39 United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, “The Private Finance Initiative.” 
www.mod.uk/aboutus/factfiles/pfi.htm. November 2003. 
40 United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, “The Private Finance Initiative.”  
www.mod.uk/aboutus/factfiles/pfi.htm. November 2003. 
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I.   UK MOD CONTRACT MANAGEMENT41 
The role of contract management “is to ensure that the legitimate needs of the user 
of the service are satisfied within the agreed boundaries of the contract.42”  Because a PFI 
is still a project and responsibility of the public sector, there must be some mechanism in 
place to oversee and supervise the private sector component to ensure that it is meeting 
the public policy objectives.  Through proper contract management, the government can  
ensure that the legitimate needs of the user of the service are satisfied 
within the agreed boundaries of the contract. All user aspirations not 
covered by the contract will require contract amendments. Changes 
requested by the users will need to be considered on their merit with 
regard to the contract SoR (Schedule of Requirements), budgetary 
implications and the possible impact on other users43. 
The UK MOD has already spent four years negotiating a preliminary PFI 
arrangement for its engineer equipment requirements.  To coordinate the efforts, it 
organized a full time IPT.  In its PFI guidance, the UK MOD has outlined the following 
points to consider44: 
• The form of the team required to manage the contract (size, skill set, roles and 
responsibilities, and relationships with other parts of the MoD). 
• Contract change procedure. 
• Performance monitoring arrangements and the associated information 
requirements.  
• Mechanisms for problem solving and dispute resolution. 
• Arrangements in the event of default or termination. 
• Protection of the MOD's ability to re-tender at completion of the original 
contract.  
                                                 
41 Chancellor of the Exchequer, Private Opportunity, Public Benefit: Progressing the Private Finance 
Initiative, pp. 24, Her Majesty’s Treasury, November 1995. 
42 United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, “PFI Guidelines:  The Phases of a PFI Project – Contract 




Last but not least in the UK MOD guidance on contract management for PFI’s are 
periodic reviews of the contractor’s performance.  While reviews can be time consuming 
and burdensome, they are critical to ensure that the objectives of the PFI are being met 
and that the public interest is being protected.  . 
 
J.   HOW DOES THE UK MOD IMPLEMENT PFI’S? 
Appendix C outlines the UK MOD PFI decision making process. It has three 
phases45: feasibility, procurement, contract management.  It is not the intent of this thesis 
to discuss in detail each of the phases of a PFI; rather, to show that there is a structured 
decision making process involved.  Even though this process is a UK MOD 
implementation process, it is not dissimilar to the DOD decision making process.   
1. Feasibility Phase 
During the feasibility phase, the government puts together an IPT to do a detailed 
analysis of what product or service is required and if it can be met with a PFI.  It is 
important that the basic principles of the required capability and requirements be sound, 
because everything that happens down the course will in some way depend on a decision 
that was made during this phase.  It is important to remember that based on the basic 
principles outlined during the feasibility phase that “industry will judge whether or not to 
bid46.”   
Once the need has been determined, then a project management team is formed to 
guide the effort during the rest of the feasibility phase.  The team should be a multi-
disciplinary Integrated Project Management Team (IPMT), the “consist of representatives 
from all those branches with an interest in the service to be delivered47”. 
 The feasibility phase ends in an outlined business case (OBC) that projects the 
advantages of a PFI.  Because of the complexity and variability of PFI, it is “accepted 
that the OBC cannot provide firm costs for the PFI solution, it merely seeks, with 
                                                 
45 United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, “PFI Guidelines:  The Phases of a PFI Project”  
http://www.mod.uk/business/ppp/guidelines/phases.htm.  November 2003. 
46 Ibid. 
47 United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, “PFI Guidelines:  The Phases of a PFI Project – Feasibility.” 
http://www.mod.uk/business/ppp/guidelines/feasibility.htm.  November 2003. 
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reasoned argument illustrated where possible with examples and numbers, that PFI is 
likely to offer the best value for money solution48.” 
2. Procurement Phase 
During the procurement phase, the government puts out a solicitation to industry 
requesting they formulate a plan to meet the government’s requirement.  The intent is to 
provide the private sector with the maximum flexibility to provide innovative ways to 
meet the government requirement.  Once a contractor has been selected, then there must 
be a comprehensive determination of all of the requirements that need to go into the 
contract.  This phase ends with contract award.   
3. Contract Management Phase 
The contract management phase can be complicated as well, but it will also 
require considerable effort in oversight to make sure that it works well.  Because of the 
length of the standard PFI, it is important to have a contract management team composed 
of personnel that will be able to dedicate many years to the program to ensure continuity.  
Also, no matter how much preparation goes into the contract, there will always be 
required changes that must be addressed. 
 
K.   HISTORY OF PFI IN THE UK 
Starting in the early 1980’s, the UK government started to seek ways to improve 
efficiency and save costs.  As part of this strategy, it encouraged competition in the 
private sector to meet its equipment and services requirements.  The benchmark was to 
prove that money could be saved without degrading operational capabilities.  Over the 
ensuing decade, the MOD used the private sector to meet increasing military service 
needs.  This policy continuously pushed the envelope on functions that once were 
considered inherently governmental, proving that it was possible to achieve costs savings 
without endangering operational requirements.   
In 1992, the UK government formally adopted the PFI concept encouraging the 
use of the private sector to meet public sector requirements.  In 199749, the UK 
government re-launched the PFI program as a form of PPP.  In the ensuing decade since 
                                                 
48 Ibid. 
49 Hartley, Keith, “Military Outsourcing Experience.”, 
http://www.york.ac.uk/depts/econ/rc/outsourcing.pdf.  November 2003. 
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1992, the UK government has used over 56350 PFI projects at a cost of over £35bn51 
(some 60 billion dollars) to meet a broad array of requirements, demonstrating the 
applicability of the concept.   
 
L.  WHERE IS PFI CURRENTLY BEING USED IN THE UK? 
The UK government had used PFI’s in a variety of military projects and 
throughout other government agencies for projects such as highways, dams, hospitals, 
roadways.  These have proven popular and to meet the expectations, as demonstrated by 
the UK Governments willingness to continue to use them.  The following are a few 
examples: 
1. Training Tank   
Currently, the UK MOD has three prospective bidders competing for a PFI 
contract to train its armored fighting vehicle crews using simulators.  The main 
requirement is for the bidders to demonstrate that they can meet the same requirement as 
the current in house option at £140million52 ($238 million) less.  This savings will be 
achieved through the use of simulators, which will to save considerable wear and tear on 
its fleet of vehicles.  Through a PFI, the government will not have to make a capital 
outlay to purchase expensive simulators53. 
2. Tank Transporter Contract   
In January 2001, the UK MOD awarded Fasttrak (“a consortium led by 
Halliburton Brown & Root”54), a 20 year PFI contract to “support and maintain the 
Oshkosh Truck/King Trailers vehicles55” as well as supply the personnel to operate them.  
A key provision of this contract is that Fasttrak personnel will operate as sponsored 
reserves in time of war. 
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51 Ibid. 
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3. Flight Training   
In August of 1998, the UK MOD awarded Aviation Training International, (GKN 
Westland/Boeing joint venture company) a PFI contract for £275m56 ($475 million)   to 
cover “air, ground and maintenance crew57” training for its new Apache helicopters.  
Through the PFI, the private sector makes the initial capital outlay to establish the 
training facility and agrees to provide the service at a lower cost than what it would cost 
the government.     
 
M.   UK MOD SUCCESS SO FAR  
In a report release by the UK Treasury in July 2003, the government reported 
overall positive experiences with the PFI contracts that had been set up.  It claimed that 
89% of contracts had either been delivered on time or ahead of schedule “within budget 
and meeting the expectations of public sector clients.”58  
 
N. UK MOD LESSONS LEARNED   
The UK treasury report59 also mentioned a few recommendations for future PFI 
projects.  Among these were: 
• That flexibility to adjust for changes without incurring penalties must be built 
into the contract. 
• That PFI projects aren’t suited to situations where there is a fast changing 
environment such as in information technology. 
• That because of their complexity, the government needs a cadre of experts to 
help draft, implement, and manage PFI contracts.  This can mean that 
                                                 
56 BBC News, “Business Targets Defense Contracts.” 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1665955.stm.  November, 2003. 
57 Equipment, Training, and Support News, “Contractors line up for PFI Projects.” 
 www.ets-news.com/armoured_vehicle.htm.  November 2003. 
58 Her Majesty’s Treasury, PFI:  Metting the investment challenge, pp.4, London, July 2003.  
59 Ibid. 
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personnel assigned to a PFI project might be assigned to the project for a 
considerable period of time. 
 The UK MOD has signed over thirty60 PFI’s by 2002 and plans on using 
them for future projects.  However, the UK MOD has established strict criteria for their 
implementation61, following the recommendations of the Paymaster General as outlined 
in Appendix B. 
 
O. UNITED STATES REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS INVOLVING PFI? 
1. Does the FAR and DFAR Allow a PFI? 
Neither the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) nor Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulations (DFAR) specifically addresses the use of PPP.  The use of PPP 
by the DOD has gone beyond the lease vs. buying statues outlined in FAR 7.4.  While 
FAR 1.102-4 (e) states that “a policy or procedure, or a particular strategy or practice62” 
may be used if it is in the best interest of the government, this is very broad guidance.  At 
the same time, the DOD has used and is planning on using different PPP arrangements to 
meet its need.   
In both the Air Force tanker deal and the Army’s Residential Communities 
Initiative (RCI), the respective Services have created private companies to manage the 
contract.  In both cases, the government is the minority owner.  While there is nothing 
particularly inappropriate with either of these arrangements, it demonstrates that PPP’s 
are very complex contractual arrangements.  The UK Government has found it necessary 
to provide adequate guidance for their PPP to protect the public interest because of the 




                                                 
60 Krahmann E., “Controlling Private Military Companies: The United Kingdom and Germany,” pp. 6, 
Harvard University, paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, February 
25 – March 1, 2003, Portland Oregon. 
61 Ibid. 
62 FAR Part 1.102-4(e), http://www.arnet.gov/far/loadmainre.html 
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2.   Inherently Governmental Functions 
The British experience with PFI’s started mainly with “non-military support and 
management63”, but over time it has transitioned to more direct combat support 
functions, bringing contractors closer to the battle lines.  The same has been true for 
DOD, as it also has sought to outsource functions that were once considered exclusively 
within the military domain.  This has been a move somewhat away from FAR 7.503, 
which states that “The purpose of this subpart is to prescribe policies and procedures to 
ensure that inherently governmental functions are not performed by contractors.” 
The resulting shift in interpretations of what is inherently governmental means 
that the regulations have fallen behind current practice.  To prevent potential conflict with 
regulations, the FAR/DFAR should re-evaluate what it describes as inherently 
























                                                 
63 Krahmann E., “Controlling Private Military Companies: The United Kingdom and Germany,” pp. 8, 
Harvard University, paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, February 
25 – March 1, 2003, Portland Oregon. 
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III. USMC ENGINEER REQUIREMENTS AND CURRENT 
STRUCTURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the intent is to define exactly what the USMC requirements for 
engineering equipment are and what the benefits and costs are associated with 
maintaining the current structure.  Understanding the requirements will allow us to better 
determine if it is feasible to support the requirements through a PFI.  The UK MOD 
stated they avoided quantitative requirements to address their requirements in a PFI in 
favor of capability based requirements64.  It is the intent of this thesis to address USMC 
requirements more through capabilities needed than through numbers of various 
equipment types.  A previous Naval Post Graduate School (NPS) thesis, An Analysis of 
USMC Heavy Construction Equipment (HCE) Requirements, concluded that the USMC 
has too much equipment and doesn’t do a good enough job maintaining what it currently 
has in its inventory. 
 
B. CURRENT STRUCTURE 
1. Background on the USMC 
The National Security Act of 1947 amended in 1952 gives the USMC its current 
mission and its structure.  It states that USMC is “trained, organized, and equipped for 
offensive amphibious employment.”65  The act established the three active USMC 
divisions and one reserve division. 
2. Organization of the USMC 
a. Marine Expeditionary Force 
The three active and one reserve Marine Divisions are centered on the four 
Marine Expeditionary Units.  Each MEF has three main components:  a Marine Division, 
A Marine Air Wing, and a Force Service Support Group.  The MEF’s are geographically 
                                                 
64 Colby, I. RE: PRIVATE FINANCE INITIATIVE INFORMATION REQUEST.  Available E-mail 
from EVPWFM@dpa.mod.uk. 18 September 2003.  
65Marine Battle Skills Training Handbook; MCWP 0-1.1, “United States Marine Corps Organization,” 
http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/csw/deskguide/Desktop%20Guide%20-
%20United%20States%20Marine%20Corps%20Organization.htm. November 2003. 
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I MEF CAMP PENDLETON, CA 
II MEF CAMP LEJEUNE, NC 
III MEF OKINAWA, JAPAN 
IV MEF NEW ORLEANS, LA 
Table 1. Location of Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF’s) 
 
b. Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) 
The USMC is structured to fight or operate as a combined arms team 
called a MAGTF, composed of four elements (see Figure 1).  The MAGTF is task-
organized according to the needs of a particular mission and is under the command of one 
commander to ensure unity of effort.  This task organization, depending on the mission 
can cause large fluctuations of requirements for different categories of equipment and 
supply and the nature of them might change over time.  A military operation can quickly 
turn into a humanitarian assistance operation.  Any potential PFI would need to 
incorporate, and be able to support such drastic and quick change.  A MAGTF can range 
in size from a few hundred Marines to tens of thousands.  For Operation Desert Storm in 
1991, the USMC MAGTF was composed on two entire MEF’s.  
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Figure 1.   Marine Air Ground Task Force 
 
c. Force Service Support Group 
The USMC Combat Service Support (CSS) is primarily organized around 
the Force Service Support Group (FSSG) and Marine Wing Support Group (MWSG), 
designed to provide CSS for Marine Aircraft Wing’s.  While all units have organic CSS 
capabilities, the bulk of the CSS is provided by either the FSSG or MWSG.  They can 
cover the full range of CSS services:  supply, maintenance, general engineering, 
transportation, health services, and services66.  Each of these functions is normally 
assigned to a battalion within the FSSG or MWSG.   
d. Engineer Support Battalion 
Within the FSSG, the Engineer Support Battalion (ESB) is responsible for 
providing the depth of the engineering capability for the entire MAGTF above the 
organic capabilities of individual units.  It holds the bulk of the general engineering assets 
for the USMC and it can be task organized to support varying missions.  All of the 
engineer equipment in the ESB is commercially available equipment.  ESB’s doctrinal 
mission is:  
                                                 
66 UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS, Logistics Operations School, Marine Corps Service Support 
Schools, “Introduction to Logistics and Combat Service Support (CSS),”  
 http://www.lejeune.usmc.mil/mccsss/los/Lessons/LEC/C104.pdf.  November 2003.  
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to provide combat engineering and limited engineering, bulk liquid, and 
utility support for the  MAGTF67 
 Figure 2 shows the organization of the ESB.   
 
Figure 2.   Organization of the Engineer Support Battalion.68 
 
e. Marine Wing Support Squadron 
Within the Marine Aircraft Wing, the Marine Wing Support Squadron 
(MWSS) “provides the full range of aviation ground support (AGS) capabilities.69”  
These functions are designed to support the unique requirements for airfield operations 
for “both expeditionary and fixed-based locations.70”  Each MWSG usually supports four 
squadrons, “two for fixed-wing aircraft, and two for rotary-wing aircraft”71.  All of the 
engineer equipment in the MWSG is commercially available equipment.  Figure 3 shows 
the organization for the MWSG. 
                                                 
67 United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps War Publication 3-17: Engineer Operations, pp.1-9, 14 
February 2000. 
68 Ibid.  
69 Ibid, pp.1-6. 
70 Ibid.  
71 Ibid, pp.1-7. 
29
 
Figure 3.     Organization of the MWSG72. 
 
f. Combat Engineer Battalion 
Within the Marine Division, the Combat Engineer Battalion provides the 
combat engineer functions.  The bulk of the equipment within the CEB is not commercial 
in nature, but rather specifically designed to perform combat engineer functions.  The 
combat engineer equipment is based on commercial equipment, making its maintenance 
similar to that in the commercial market place. Its mission “is to enhance the mobility, 
counter-mobility, and survivability of the Marine Division through combat and limited 
general engineering support.73” 
Figure 4, shows the organization of the ESB.  Each Combat Engineer 
Company normally supports a Regiment within the Marine Division. 
 
                                                 





Figure 4.     Organization of the Engineer Support Battalion (ESB)74 
 
3. Support Structure 
There is a large support infrastructure associated with the Engineer Equipment in 
the USMC.  There are bases where the equipment is kept and maintained; Military 
Occupational Specialty (MOS) schools that train the equipment operators and mechanics; 
and a large logistics and supply system that supports the entire establishment.   
The entire base infrastructure is expensive to maintain and it involves some 
duplication of capabilities to support the geographically dispersed units.  This duplication 
requires the investment of additional manpower that is drained from the operating forces. 
The school infrastructure also draws manpower from the operating forces to train 
the next generation of mechanics and operators.  The training is comparable to that in the 
private sector.  The school structure is maintained year round and runs 30 courses a year 
to meet requirements to reflect the rate at which new Marines graduate from basic 
training75.  
4. Manpower 
There are currently some 8000 Marines76 involved in the engineer community 
divided into some 14 primary MOS’s (Appendix E) that support the table of organization 
(T/O) personnel requirements for all Engineer billets in the USMC.  Of these, there is 
                                                 
74 United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps War Publication 3-17: Engineer Operations, pp.1-9, 14 
February 2000. MCWP 1-4. 
75 Combat Engineer instruction Company, FY-2004 Schedule Classes, 
http://www.lejeune.usmc.mil/mces/CEIC/BCE_04.htm.  November December 2003.  
76 United States Marine Corps Manpower and Reserve Affairs, “MOS 13XX from Aug 03 FYDP”.  
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approximately a sixty six percent turnover of personnel every four years77.  This turnover 
makes it hard to keep institutional knowledge and core competencies.  For all MOS’s, it 
takes from 6 to 9 months to get a basically trained Marine and up to an additional 2 years 
to make the Marine truly proficient in their MOS.  Part of the reason for this has to do 
with the broad types of equipment that military personnel must master.  This can leave as 
little as one years worth of time of a truly efficient operator or mechanic available to the 
USMC.   
5. The Equipment  
 The USMC has invested over one billion dollars78 in its engineer equipment. 
Appendix D lists all of the Engineer equipment broken down by Table of Authorized 
Material (TAM) number in the USMC inventory.  The basis for keeping this equipment is 
the Table of Equipment (T/E), which states how much equipment the USMC, should 
maintain to meet all of its contingency requirements.  Engineer Equipment is classified as 
B (Bravo) TAM.  The existing T/E dates back to the 1970’s, and the current fleet reflects 
those requirements79.  The USMC T/E has not been updated, despite USMC personnel 
strength has being reduced since the end of the cold war.   
This disconnect has led to equipment being purchased that was really not needed.  
In addition, on a day-to-day basis, the USMC only uses approximately fifteen to twenty 
percent of its engineer assets to meet its operational requirements.  This leads to 
underutilization of the fleet, most of which sits idle on various lots around the bases.  In 
contrast, utilization in the private sector hovers well above eighty percent80 of on-hand 
equipment.   
                                                 
77 United States Marine Corps, “JOINT STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL CAROL A. MUTTER 
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS 
AND MAJOR GENERAL JACK W. KLIMP COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS RECRUITING 
COMMAND BEFORE THE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY 
PERSONNEL ON 12 MARCH 1998 ON RECRUITING AND RETENTION.”  
http://armedservices.house.gov/testimony/105thcongress/3-12-98mutter-klimp.htm.  November 2003. 
 
78 Marine Corps System Command, Private Finance initiative – Private Opportunity Public Benefit, 
Slide 11, 14 March 2003. 
79 Telephone conversation between Mike Farley, GTES, MarCorSysCom and the author, 5 November 
2003. 
80 Interview with James R. McCormack, Manager United Rentals, Seaside, California., and the author, 
17 October 2003. 
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Only twice in the last twenty years has the USMC used the bulk of its engineer 
equipment, and that occurred with Operation Desert Storm, 1991 and operation Iraqi 
Freedom in 2003.  This comparison is not entirely fair because the military’s objective is 
different than that of the private sector.  But it does serve to demonstrate that for its 
normal peacetime environment, the USMC has too much equipment.  If the war time 
surge needs could be met through outsourcing, then there is high probably a cost savings 
could be achieved. 
 
C. MAINTENANCE PROCESS 
1. Introduction 
The USMC maintenance of equipment is divided into five echelons of 
maintenance, first through fifth.  These are further divided into three main levels, organic, 
intermediate, and depot level maintenance (Table 2).  Although the levels of maintenance 
and responsibility for them are defined according to the breakdown in Table 2, there is 
some overlapping authorized, which varies depending on the type of equipment and 
occasionally on the mission and available resources. 
 
Echelons of Maintenance 
Organic 1st & 2nd EOM 
Intermediate 3rd & 4th EOM 
Depot 5th EOM 
 
Table 2. Echelons of Maintenance (EOM) 
 
2. Organic Maintenance 
Normally, the organic levels of maintenance are the responsibility of the using 
unit.  This is tasked to the equipment operators and the using unit mechanics.  The skill 
set required to conduct the lowest level of maintenance are quickly developed by military 
personnel.  One of the main tasks for organic maintenance is to conduct proper 
Preventive Maintenance (PM) on the equipment to keep the equipment in operational 
order.  The USMC defines organic maintenance as: 
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Maintenance performed by the trained operator, maintainer/technician, or 
crew on the unit's assigned equipment. Generally consists of limited action 
by crew or operator to include cleaning, inspecting, preserving, 
lubricating, adjusting, and testing as well as replacing parts, minor 
assemblies, and sub-assemblies as unit mission dictates and as defined by 
operator, maintainer/technician or crew MOS (Individual Training 
Standards) ITS.81 
The Marine Corps does a good job at training both its equipment operators and 
mechanics to conduct organic maintenance.  For one, the skills are not that difficult to 
learn and they are practiced with regular routine at all units that own the equipment. 
3. Intermediate Maintenance 
Intermediate maintenance is tasked to specialized maintenance companies, in the 
case of engineer equipment, to Engineer Maintenance Company within the FSSG.  Any 
truck related intermediate maintenance of engineer equipment is tasked to Motor 
Transport Maintenance Company within the FSSG.  Intermediate level maintenance is 
defined as: 
Those maintenance actions performed by specifically trained personnel 
normally in support of using organizations. This level of maintenance 
assures a comprehensive [bumper to bumper] repair of components and/or 
end items usually consisting of calibration, repair or replacement of 
damaged or unserviceable parts, components, or assemblies. Intermediate 
maintenance serves to support lower levels of maintenance by providing 
technical assistance and performing maintenance beyond the supported 
unit's capability82. 
Maintenance at this level is normally performed at an intermediate level 
maintenance activity, EMC or MTM for engineer equipment.  These facilities are fixed in 
a garrison environment and deploy in full (or in part) to support operations.  Despite their 
ability to deploy, they are not easily relocated and have a heavy logistics footprint.  
Equipment must be evacuated back to this facility to get repaired, which can put a burden 
on forward units.   
                                                 
81 United States Marine Corps, Installation and Logistics Department, Logistics Enterprise Integration 
Center  http://www.hqmc.usmc.mil/LPI.NSF. November 2003. 
82 ROM WIPT Session V Information, “Proposed Levels of Maintenance Definitions.” 
http://www.hqmc.usmc.mil/LPI.NSF.  November 2003. 
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To help minimize this problem, intermediate maintenance companies that deploy 
use contact maintenance teams to conduct intermediate maintenance repairs on site in the 
field.  Contact maintenance teams are a mechanic shop on wheels, usually a High 
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV).  However, contact maintenance 
teams are limited in both number and in the type of repairs that they can conduct, which 
vary by equipment type.  This is a sharp contrast to similar mobile repairs units in the 
private sector that can carry enough equipment to perform all levels of intermediate 
maintenance on equipment.  For example, Caterpillar Corporation claims that its mobile 
maintenance repair vehicles are capable of all intermediate maintenance on their 
equipment83.       
4. Depot Level Maintenance 
Depot level maintenance is tasked to the USMC Logistics bases in Albany, GA or 
Barstow, CA.  Depot level maintenance is defined as: 
Maintenance performed on material requiring major overhaul or complete 
rebuild of parts, subassemblies, assemblies or end items, including the 
manufacture of parts, modifications, testing and reclamation as required.  
Depot maintenance serves to support lower levels of maintenance by 
providing technical assistance and performing maintenance beyond their 
responsibility.84 
Depot level maintenance is the most complicated of all maintenance tasks.  The 
level of proficiency required for the mechanics at this level takes many years to develop.  
For this reason, most of the depot level maintenance has been turned over to civilian 
government employees that work at either of the two main logistics bases.  In addition, 
the need to have to send secondary repairable components back to these bases, has forced 
the USMC to keep a large back-up inventory of the items throughout the world.  The 
dollar value of the inventory is estimated to exceed six hundred million dollars85.   
 
 
                                                 
83 Interview with James R. McCormack, Manager United Rentals, Seaside, California., and the author, 
17 October 2003. 
84 ROM WIPT Session V Information, “Proposed Levels of Maintenance Definitions.” 
http://www.hqmc.usmc.mil/LPI.NSF.  November 2003. 
85 USMC Installation and Logistics Division, Logistics Enterprise Integration Brief, Slide 68. 9 
January 2003. 
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D. LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT 
The USMC has not had a program to analyze or manage the life cycle costs of the 
equipment it purchases.  It buys new engineer equipment to meet the planned allowance. 
As the equipment is disposed of through the Defense Reutilization Marketing Office 
(DRMO), it buys replacement equipment piecemeal.  The process for disposing of 
equipment is not very structured and it relies heavily on the opinion of the requesting 
command.  This demonstrates that the current USMC life cycle management is not 
effectively managing government assets. 
In 1997, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen announced  “that reducing total 
ownership costs for our defense systems not only made good sense but was the only way 
that the Department of Defense (DOD) would be able to afford to sustain and modernize 
its weapon systems in the near future.86” 
As a result of this guidance, the USMC as well as the other services began 
looking for ways to obtain accurate Life Cycle Cost (LCC).  What the USMC is doing 
will be discussed in the section of emerging concepts.  LCC analysis is composed of two 
main parts, the acquisition cost plus the operation and maintenance costs (O&M).  While 
the USMC can identify the amount of money spent on acquiring new equipment, 
obtaining an accurate forecast of future O&M costs has been difficult if not impossible.  
While the USMC does have a system designed to do that, the Marine Corps Integrated 
Maintenance Management System – Automated Information System (MIMMS-AIS), the 
system has not worked.  The system doesn’t capture costs such as “pre-expended bin 
items, non-system national stock numbers (NSN), and open/credit card purchases”.87  
Also there is generally poor record keeping and inaccurate data entry at the unit level.  
Likewise, there is no system to centrally track condition and use of the equipment.  
Analyzing LCC for individual equipment types is difficult if not impossible.  Inability to 
analyze LCC is a problem not only for the USMC, but also for the entire DOD.   
                                                 
86 LtCol Mathews, Randy A., “A Secretary of Defense imperative.” 
http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/JanFeb99/MS368.htm.  November 2003.  
87 Blaxton, A.C., Fay, M.J., Hansen, C.M., Zuchristian, C.M.,  An Analysis of USMC Heavy 
Construction Equipment (HCE) Requirements.  MBA Professional Report, Naval Post Graduate School, 
Monterey, California, June 2003. 
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Marine LCC management stands in sharp contrast to that in the private sector.  
Two firms contacted during this study, Caterpillar and United Rentals claimed to be able 
to track not only exact LCC but also the condition and usage of all of their equipment.  
This ability is central to their competitive advantage in the market place.  Failure to do so 




The USMC engineer equipment fleet provides broad engineer support to the 
entire Fleet Marine Force (FMF).  How can this support be defined?  As noted this 
analysis follows a capability based assessment rather than a quantitative analysis.  
Although exact numbers of equipment types in the fleet and their location are known, it 
has been demonstrated that they are not tied to current requirements.  In addition, the 
quantity and disposition of equipment is more an estimate of requirements, as they can 
change drastically with mission type.  What is known is that the USMC under uses its 
engineer equipment in comparison to the private sector, an average of 200 hours per year 
versus 2000 hours per year.  It was also demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, that the USMC requires a large amount of engineer equipment 
in a major war scenario.   
Faced with these two contrasts, this thesis will address USMC engineer 
requirements in terms of capabilities instead of numbers of equipment type.  The 
following sections address capabilities the USMC needs from its engineer equipment 
fleet.  The USMC defines engineering capabilities in four broad categories.  There are 
“mobility, counter-mobility, survivability and general engineering support88”.  The first 
three capabilities have a more direct combat support role, whereas the last one covers a 
broad range of engineering tasks.  Throughout the different types of capabilities, there is 
a duplication of functions.  The primary source document is USMC War Publication 3-
17, Engineer Operations.89 
                                                 
88 Installation and Logistics Department: Engineer Advocacy Center (EAC), “Engineer Advocacy 
Center Charter.” http://www.hqmc.usmc.mil/LPEWeb.nsf.  November, 2003. 
89 United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps War Publication 3-17: Engineer Operations, 14 
February 2000. MCWP 1-4. 
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2. Mobility 
Mobility is the capability of the MAGTF to “move in time and space while 
retaining their ability90” to complete their mission.  There are five mobility functions that 
the MAGTF expects from engineers: countermine, counter obstacles (breaching), gap-
crossing, combat roads and repair, and forward aviation combat engineering (FACE). 
3. Counter-Mobility 
As its name implies, counter-mobility is defined as the “physical shaping of the 
battle space to alter the scheme of maneuver of the enemy91”.  The intent is to restrict the 
enemy’s operations to allow the MAGTF the “opportunity to exploit enemy 
vulnerabilities or react to enemy actions.92” 
4. Survivability 
Survivability “includes all aspects of protecting personnel, weapons, and 
supplies”. 93 It is primarily associated with the constructing field fortifications to protect 
personnel and equipment from enemy weapons fire. 
5. General Engineering Support 
General engineering refers to those activities that contribute “to force sustainment 
by enhancing the environment to improve operational tempo in the94” AOR.  Like the 
previous engineering capabilities, they are a force multiplier that enhances the MAGTF’s 
combat power.  There are eight broad classes of general engineer support.  These are:  
construction, airfield support, bridging support, follow-on breaching and/or area 
clearance, electrical support, bulk liquid support, explosive ordnance disposal, and port 
operations.  This section will briefly discuss these classes of engineering support. 
a. Construction Types   
There are two classifications of construction types: vertical and horizontal.  
Vertical construction refers to “the improvement or construction facilities for use by the 
MAGTF.95”  The types of vertical construction are: 
                                                 
90 Ibid, pp. 4-8. 
91 Ibid, pp. 4-11. 
92 Ibid, pp. 4-11. 
93 United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps War Publication 3-17: Engineer Operations, pp.4-11, 
14 February 2000. MCWP 1-4.MCWP 3-17. 
94 Ibid, pp. 5-1. 
95 Ibid.  
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• Wood and masonry 
• Existing facilities rehabilitation 
• Structural Reinforcement 
Horizontal constructions are those “required to shape the terrain to meet 
the operational requirements of the MAGTF.96” The types of vertical construction 
include: 
• Main Supply Route (MSR) construction and/or maintenance 
• Expeditionary Airfield  
• Site preparation for bed down facilities 
• Ordnance storage facilities 
b. Airfield Support  
Airfield support capabilities are those required to ensure the fullest 
operation of the airfield to allow the ACE to bring maximum assets to help the MAGTF 
effort.  It can mean the construction of a new airfield, expansion or rehabilitation of 
current airfield, or rapid runway repair to bring an airfield back into operation following 
an enemy attack.  The ACE is a major component of the MAGTF and it is the engineer’s 
job to ensure that airfields are as capable as possible of sustaining air operations. 
c. Bridging Support  
Bridging support helps the MAGTF maintain its momentum by 
overcoming gaps (rivers and/or natural or man made ditches).  Depending on the size of 
the gap, it can require as little as one bridge laying equipment vehicle to a full battalion 
effort or greater.  Quick gap crossings are critical to avoid unnecessary concentration of 
forces.   
d. Follow-on Breaching and/or Area Clearance  
The breaching capabilities under the general engineering support 
operations are designed to augment those done by the assault echelons under the mobility 
capability.  Those are done by the assault unit to get through an enemy obstacle.  The 
follow-on support in trace is generally much larger than the assault unit and the initial 
breach might not be large enough to allow for adequate flow of equipment and supplies.  
It is in this instance, when follow-on breaching and/or area clearance comes into effect.  
                                                 
96 Ibid. 
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e. Electrical Support  
Warfare is destructive in nature and normally results in the destruction of 
at least part of the local infrastructure.  As the MAGTF advances towards its objective it 
can find that there are limited or no readily available power supplies.  It is in these 
situations that mobile electric power (MEP) is essential to provide the MAGTF with its 
own power needs.      
f. Bulk Liquid Support  
The modern MAGTF is heavily dependent on the supply of water and 
especially fuel to sustain its operations.  Lack of fuel can adversely impact both the rate 
of the advance and the air operations of the ACE.  It is the responsibility of the ESB to 
transfer and store Class III (bulk liquids) for the MAGTF. 
g. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) 
The modern battlefield is filled with ordnance of varying types, both 
friendly and foreign.  EOD assets support the clearing and defusing of ordnance to ensure 
the safety of an area of operations. 
h. Port Operations 
The USMC is an amphibious force, designed to come ashore through a 
hostile beach.  While the USMC has not attempted a full scale amphibious operation 
since the Korean War, it has initiated most of its operations since then from ships.  
Engineers can play a critical role in the initial offloading of equipment and supplies by 
creating or improving a port facility.   
 
F. NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCE 
The Naval Construction Force (NCF) or the “Seabees” is the engineering unit 
within the Navy.  They have considerable more depth and capabilities than the USMC 
ESB.  NCF units provide general engineering support to the MAGTF and are under its 
operational control.  The NCF “reinforces and augments the MAGTF’s limited 
engineering capability” and they are part of the planning for any major operation.  We 
mention them because the NCF is integral to the USMC engineering capabilities.  Any 




G. EMERGING CONCEPTS 
1. Joint Vision 2010 & 2020 
Joint Vision 2010 & 2020 has forced the services to start working closer together. 
The objective is to transform the military towards to the future war fighting force to 
achieve the goal of ensuring that the U.S. military can maintain full spectrum dominance 
on the battlefield.  Full-spectrum dominance is achieved through four capabilities: 
“dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics and full-dimensional 
protection.97”  In the realm of focused logistics, it has stated that the goal is to better 
support the war fighter through an integrated system.  This system will “provide a more 
seamless connection to the commercial sector to take advantage of applicable advanced 
business practices and commercial economies.”98   
Focused logistics in Joint Vision 2010 & 2020 encourages the Services to 
improve the manner in which logistics supports the war fighter in part by looking at new 
ways of doing and providing logistics.  This is a path that all of the services have started 
over the last couple of years.  
2. USMC Strategy 21 
The USMC has laid out its strategy to achieve the objectives of Joint Vision 2010 
& 2020 through USMC Strategy 21.  As part of this strategy, the USMC has set a course 
to change the way in which it fights.  This new strategy is called Operational Maneuver 
from the Sea (OMFTS), which we will discuss in more detail in the next section.  In the 
area of focused logistics, Strategy 21 encourages “enhanced experimentation to include 
ways to accomplish acquisition, logistics, and support tasks through technological 
innovations, outsourcing, and other techniques.99” 
To this end, the USMC has implemented a number of logistics initiatives to 
improve logistics processes through the use of “prime vendor, partnership with industry, 
                                                 
97 Joint Chief’s of Staff, Joint Vision 2020, pp. 2, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC., June 
2000. 
98 Joint Chief’s of Staff, Joint Vision 2020, pp. 31, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC., June 
2000. 
99 United States Marine Corps, USMC Strategy 21, pp.8, Department of the Navy Headquarters United 
States Marine Corps Washington, D.C., 2003. 
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and contractor logistics support.100”  In addition, the USMC is continuing to push the 
envelope on looking at sourcing services that were once considered core competencies. 
3. Operational Maneuver from the Sea 
Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) is a strategy that will allow the 
USMC to assault its objectives as the name implies from the sea, without the need to 
establish an operating base ashore.  Its aim is to use the vastness of the sea as a staging 
area from which an assault can be launched on the enemy’s center of gravity or exploit 
enemy vulnerabilities.   
a. Ship to Shore 
OMFTS requires the ability to quickly deploy from ship to shore to put 
overwhelming force on a target before the enemy has a chance to organize effective 
resistance.  This will require equipment that the USMC is developing to include the 
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV), MV-22, Joint Strike Fighter, and the 
next generation Landing Helicopter Assault (LHA) ship, the Landing Helicopter 
Experimental (LHX).  This operational structure will require that the engineering 
community develop ways adapt to a fast pace environment.  
b. Reduced Logistics Footprint 
Because OMFTS will require sea basing to conduct operations, it will 
require a substantially reduced logistics footprint, which is a change from the traditional 
USMC iron mountain mentality that requires enough supplies to cover all eventualities.  
To achieve a reduced logistics footprint, the USMC is attempting to create a more 
responsive supply and maintenance system that will allow for the storing of just the right 
amount of equipment to meet operational needs.  The keys to this initiative will be to101: 
• Modernize Logistics Information Systems 
• Improve Equipment Readiness 
• Improve Logistics Response Time 
• Reshape Intermediate Level Inventory 
 
                                                 
100 MajGen Higginbotham, G.B., “USMC Logistics Transformation,” brief presented to the National 
Defense Industrial Association, 27 April 1999. 
101 MajGen Higginbotham, G.B., “USMC Logistics Transformation,” brief presented to the National 
Defense Industrial Association, 27 April 1999. 
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4. Adopting Best Business Practices 
In the drive to transform the military, it has become obvious that in many regards, 
the military is well behind the private sector in terms of efficiencies.  While the 
commercial sector has been forced to find the most effective means to conduct business, 
the military did not pick up on this until budgets became tight in the early 1990’s.  The 
USMC has pushed hard to achieve efficiencies in all areas and has active programs under 
way to incorporate best business practices into its own processes.  Among the initiative 
the USMC is trying to implement are:   
• Partnership with academic institutions 
• Internships in Private industry 
• Partnering with Private industry 
• Outsourcing  
5. Five to Three EOM 
One initiative that is currently underway is the transformation of the EOM from 
five levels to three.  The new proposal is to create three levels: organizational, 
intermediate, and depot level (see figure 5).   
 
 
Figure 5.   Proposed Levels of Maintenance102 
 
6. Marine Corps Logistics Command (MARCORLOGCOM) 
We mentioned in a previous section that the USMC has not had a Life Cycle Cost 
management program and that it has historically been unable to capture the associated 
                                                 
102 USMC Logistics Enterprise Integration.  Shaping Logistics to Support the 21st Century 
Warfighting. 
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costs.  Recently, the USMC integrated USMC Material Command (MCMC) and USMC 
Logistics Bases (MCLB) into a new command, USMC Logistics Command 
(MARCORLOGCOM).  Its mission is to provide 
worldwide, integrated logistics/supply chain and distribution management; 
depot level maintenance management; and strategic pre-positioning 
capability in support of the operating forces and other supported units to 
maximize their readiness and sustainability and to support enterprise and 
program level Total Life Cycle Management.103   
This new Command will finally attempt to address the LCC of equipment in the 
inventory, which should lead to better decision making process about investment in the 
equipment fleets of both the future and the present. 
 
H. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we have outlined the current: structure of the engineer community, 
maintenance process, life cycle management, capability requirements, and emerging 
concepts that affect the community.  The intent has been to analyze the engineer 
community to see how it currently operates, what it does well, where there are 
deficiencies, and where it is going.  Having a though rough understanding of these 
concepts is critical if we are to try to define the requirements for an outsourcing option 
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IV. USMC REQUIREMENTS FOR A PFI 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The intent of this chapter is to outline how a PFI could work and the requirements 
that the USMC would need to include in a proposed PFI.  While not an all inclusive list, 
the intent of this approach (creating such an outline and a list of requirement) is to 
provide a rough planning document that can be initially used by an IPT.  This chapter 
will first outline the assumptions that the proposed PFI is based on in order to put it in 
context.  Next, it will outline the requirements that the USMC needs to consider in such a 
PFI.   
As was covered in Chapter III, USMC requirements can be defined in terms of 
quantity of equipment, capabilities (packages of different equipment types), and training 
requirements.  How can USMC engineer equipment (commercial and military unique) 
requirements be defined?  One answer is by equipment type based on the current needs 
and T/E tables.  Does this solve the problem of getting what is need where we need it?  
The equipment is spread out over the globe to meet USMC operational and contingency 
needs.  This includes USMC war reserve material.  The result is that there is too much 
equipment on hand to meet many contingency requirements, and the current problem of 
not being able to manage it effectively.   
The same approach applied to a PFI, would likely force the contractor to have too 
much equipment in standby mode, increasing cost to the government.  Because the 
private sector already has equipment throughout the world, it is best to define USMC 
needs in terms of capabilities to assemble within predetermined time periods.  The private 
sector would then agree to meet the capability need; however, this would also be a 
quantitative need that must be addressed through a matrix.  A sample decision matrix will 
be included in a later section.  
It is important to keep in mind that USMC engineer equipment needs account for 
a very small percentage of the private sector availability.  With this in mind, it would be 
conceivable to have the private sector meet USMC needs across the spectrum of 
capabilities.  It could be deemed a “fact” that there exists enough capability to meet all of 
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our equipment requirements.  An option of how to meet USMC engineer equipment 
requirements would be to use the UK MOD engineer PFI equipment requirement 
proposal (Appendix F) that defines requirements in terms of capabilities and time tables.   
 
B. ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Restructure USMC CSS for Engineer Equipment 
In Chapter III, the current structure of the USMC Engineer Community is 
outlined.  In Chapter I, it was stated that one of the reasons for seeking the outsourcing of 
capabilities is to allow the military to concentrate on those tasks that it does well and 
needs to keep in house and to allow contractors to do the rest.  This is also one of the 
main justifications for adopting a PFI solution.  The analysis indicates a PFI type 
alternative can be effective for the USMC Engineer needs.   However, the current EOM 
CSS needs to be restructured to allow for the USMC to concentrate on its core tasks 
while outsourcing (through the PFI) the rest. 
For the purposes of this analysis, it is proposed that a restructured EOM CSS 
operate as follows.  That the Marine Corps concentrate on those EOM tasks that can be 
accomplished by equipment operators and maintenance contact teams, preferably one’s 
with enhanced capabilities.  This would allow the Marine Corps to concentrate on 
providing those EOM tasks that can be accomplished in a field environment.  For those 
tasks that cannot be accomplished in a field environment, it is proposed that they be 
outsourced to the private sector through a PFI.   
In effect, this would leave two EOM vice the current five or the proposed three.  
One would be the responsibility of the USMC and the other would be the responsibility 
of the private sector.  Where in the EOM spectrum would the line of responsibility be 
drawn?  This line would vary by equipment type and capability of the maintenance 
contact teams, yet in all probability it would be somewhere between the current 3rd and 
4th EOM.  For the purposed of this thesis, this range will be referred to as Field Capable 
Maintenance (FCM).  Those tasks that do not fall within the FCM range will be referred 
to as Non-Field Capable Maintenance (NFCM).  
This division of tasks would allow the USMC to maintain and concentrate on 
critical core competencies (FCM) that it needs military personnel to accomplish on the 
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battlefield.  This thesis assumes that there is no inherent need for the government to 
accomplish higher echelons of maintenance.  The bulk of USMC Engineer equipment is 
commercially available and serviceable around the world. 
The reasoning for proposing such a restructuring is based on three presumptions.  
First, the USMC is fairly good at training equipment operators and mechanics to conduct 
FCM.  The skills required to conduct these levels of maintenance can be easily achieved 
through MOS School and OJT at units.  Furthermore, these skills are more easily 
acquired in a relatively short period of time, and they provide units with corporate 
knowledge that can be maintained despite high personnel turnover.   
On the other hand, the skills required to conduct NFCM are not easily learned.  
Due to their complexity, it requires training for prolonged periods to master.  This is not 
beyond the capability of military personnel, but it is not practical due to frequent 
rotations.  In the private sector, mechanics that perform this type of maintenance 
routinely do so for their entire career.  In fact, the USMC currently uses civilian 
contractors or government personnel to conduct the bulk of fourth through fifth EOM, 
which represent the range covered by NFCM. 
The second presumption is that relying on operators and enhanced maintenance 
contact teams both in garrison and in an operational environment would allow the USMC 
to “train as we fight.” This would eliminate problems associated with transitioning from 
peace to war and vice versa.  In a combat or operational environment, USMC CSS in the 
field is conducted primarily through maintenance contact teams.   
A recent after action report from Iraq104 recommended that the USMC logistics 
community operate in peacetime as it does in wartime.  It noted that there was difficulty 
transitioning from its garrison environment during the recent conflict in Iraq.  This would 
entail transforming both EMC and MTM into maintenance contact team companies that 
would dispatch maintenance contact teams to conduct on site repairs.  Because 
maintenance contact teams would be military, this would avoid the problem of 
contractors on the battlefield.  However, maintenance contact teams are currently not 
structured to conduct the full range of FCM.  Among other things, the USMC would need 
                                                 
104 Regimental Combat Team Five, “Operation Iraqi Freedom Logistics After Action Report,” pp.6. 
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vehicles that carry more capabilities than the current HMMWV based maintenance 
contact teams. 
Recommendation:  USMC study how to increase capabilities of maintenance 
contact teams to support FCM.  
The third presumption is that any required maintenance that falls in the category 
of NFCM requires equipment that is not readily available in a field environment, even to 
an enhance maintenance contact team; rather it requires a fixed facility.  A fixed facility 
is usually established in rear areas, well away from a combat zone if not outside the 
theater of operations.  This facility is not easily moved; equipment requiring this level of 
maintenance is usually evacuated with wreckers.  Because the NFCM EOM facility 
would always be established in a rear area, it makes sense to have civilian contractors 
conduct these repairs.  As mentioned under reason number one, civilian personnel are 
more efficient at conducting NFCM than military personnel. 
2. How would the PFI work? 
The specific details or requirements of how the proposed PFI would work are 
presented in section C of this chapter.  The basic proposal for this PFI would be for a 
consortium of companies to provide (lease or rent) the USMC Equipment needs 
throughout the world either by making the equipment available in CONUS (leaving 
transportation to the USMC) or by delivering it to a destination OCONUS (normally a 
POD or APOD).  The consortium would also be responsible for conducting all NFCM as 
well as any overflow FCM. 
For normal peacetime conditions, the USMC would lease or rent the amount of 
equipment plus the maintenance support that it needs to meet its day-to-day operational 
requirements.  For times of war, the consortium would guarantee the availability of 
equipment, within various timeframes (Table 3) to meet wartime requirements.  This 
proposition does imply a degree of risk for the USMC.  What if the equipment is not 
locally available?  Through a PFI structure, the risk is transferred to the contractor who 
would bear the responsibility of sourcing the equipment.  Accepting this degree of risk 
does imply a shift from the iron mountain mentally addressed in Chapter III.      
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Unit Equipment Available Maintenance Facility Available 
MEU/MEB/MWSG 72 hours 96 Hours 
FSSG/ACE/DIV 2 Weeks 2 Weeks 
MEF One month One Month 
Table 3. Sample Equipment and Maintenance Facility Availability Timeframe 
 
In addition, the consortium would agree to establish a maintenance facility in the 
nearest POD or APOD to support operations.  As part of the PFI, the USMC would be 
responsible for FCM while the consortium would be required to support NFCM and 
overflow FCM.  Support available from the consortium would have to be large enough to 
support the entire USMC requirement.  The consortium would also ensure that spare parts 
support would be available throughout the world either through its own distributors or 
through the military supply system.   
3. Interest from Industry 
  An assumption made in this thesis is that there is interest in the private sector for 
such a PFI type arrangement.  A number of private sector companies were contacted to 
determine their level of interest to meet the USMC Engineer equipment requirements 
through some sort of PPP.  It was learned that there is a great deal of interest from the 
private sector in doing some sort of PPP for this type of equipment although they all 
requested additional details and assumptions that this study was not prepared to give.   
Ninety eight percent105 of private sector engineer equipment is the same as that 
used by the military, the main difference being the chemical agent-resistant coating 
(CARC) paint.  Also engineer equipment is available throughout the world.  The Armed 
Forces have on many occasions rented engineer equipment in support of military 
exercises and operations.  Many engineer equipment makers are already structured to 
support their equipment on a global basis.  Further, a PPP would provide a source of 
revenue for spare capacity.  Finally, the wartime needs for the USMC would represent 
less than one percent of the commercially available equipment.  USMC wartime needs 
                                                 
105 Marine Corps System Command, Private Finance initiative – Private Opportunity Public Benefit, 
Slide 11, 14 March 2003. 
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would be a minimal drain on the commercial sector, meaning that they could easily meet 
any Marine Corps requirement.   
 
C. REQUIREMENTS TO INCLUDE IN A PFI 
This following section addresses the particular requirements that would need to be 
addressed in a PFI arrangement to support USMC Engineer requirements.  While this list 
is not all-inclusive, it does represent a good starting point for planning purposes.  For 
each item, this thesis addresses the particular requirements the USMC will need, which 
although not all inclusive either, are also a good starting point.  The reference for these 
requirements is the UK MOD requirements lists106 for their PFI arrangement for 
Engineer Equipment.  The requirements addressed in the following section are more 
qualitative than quantitative.  
 
D.  PROPOSED PFI REQUIREMENTS 
1. General Requirements 
a. Capabilities 
Capabilities address two concerns.  One is the variety of missions that the 
Marine Corps would have to accomplish with the use of engineer equipment.  The other 
is the amount of equipment needed to accomplish the missions.  The different capabilities 
required by the USMC were address in Chapter III and they are translated into the 
equipment types outlined in Appendix B.  The amount of equipment can be structured 
around being able to support varying size units like a MEU, MEB, or MEF, within 
prescribed time limits in different geographical areas. 
b. Equipment Performance  
Performance requirements address the issues of equipment reliability and 
overall fleet readiness.  The performance required from each individual type of 
equipment was addressed in Chapter III.  The other is the level of equipment readiness of 
all required equipment to support the operating forces.   
                                                 
106 Colby, I. RE: PRIVATE FINANCE INITIATIVE INFORMATION REQUEST (Schedule of 
Authority Requirements).  Available E-mail from EVPWFM@dpa.mod.uk. 10 September 2003. 
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For individual equipment types, the USMC should adopt commercial 
standards because they would meet all USMC need, and would require no modifications 
to the equipment.  A previous NPS thesis recommended the adoption of commercial 
standards because they result in higher productivity107. 
For overall equipment readiness, the USMC needs to determine an 
achievable level that balances costs vs. readiness.  The higher the required readiness of 
the equipment, the greater the cost will be.  Current USMC standards require an overall 
readiness of no less than 85% readiness for all equipment types.     
c. Equipment Replacement 
There are three conditions under which the USMC would need to have 
equipment replaced:   
• Obsolescence (end of useful life)  
• Destroyed 
• Broken beyond the level of maintenance available in the field environment.   
Both cost and time to replace are important factors to consider.  The time 
frame would be very short in a wartime or operational scenario and lengthier during 
normal garrison activities.  Above all else, the contractor must be capable of short notice 
replacement during periods of conflict.  An additional point that must be considered is 
where the contractor would be required to deliver the equipment to (the nearest POD or 
APOD) and who would be responsible for transportation. 
d. Handover of Equipment 
The USMC has spent over one billion dollars on the current fleet of 
equipment (outlined in Appendix B).  This substantial investment occurred over the 
course of two decades.  If the equipment is turned over to a contractor, a fair valuation 
must be made, based on the current condition of the fleet.  This valuation could be 
achieved either through a random sample survey or through a complete inventory.  A 
contractor would more than likely want to do a complete survey.  Regardless of the 
method chosen, the government must be careful to ensure a fair evaluation so as not to 
appear to be giving away tax payer resources.  
                                                 
107 Blaxton, A.C., Fay, M.J., Hansen, C.M., Zuchristian, C.M.,  An Analysis of USMC Heavy 
Construction Equipment (HCE) Requirements.  MBA Professional Report, Naval Post Graduate School, 
Monterey, California, June 2003. 
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How would turning over the equipment happen?  Because of the size of 
the engineer equipment fleet, a quick turnover would probably be impractical.  A gradual 
turnover would be more appropriate and provide hedges to deal with issues that would 
undoubtedly arise. 
e. Compliance with US Legislation 
The FAR and the DFAR do not specifically address PFI’s or PPP’s.  
While acquisition reform has opened the way for such outsourcing, there is no clear 
guidance.  The recent Air Force tanker deal received heavy scrutiny from Congress in 
part because it went beyond current regulations in the FAR and DFAR.  The lesson is that 
the USMC must line up political support before undertaking such a large project. 
f. Compliance with Legislation Outside US 
While agreements with other countries allow the United States to bring in 
its equipment into their borders to support operations, it must also include arrangements 
for our contractors, as they will probably have to establish or upgrade infrastructure to 
support operations.  While this might seem trivial, because of our reliance on contractors 
in a PFI arrangement, it cannot be taken for granted.      
2. PART II:  Service Support Requirements 
a.  Service Support 
We have proposed that the USMC rely on the contractor for all NFCM.  
What needs to be addressed in this section is the turnaround rate that the contractor 
should meet.  Would there be a guaranteed turn around time of so many days or hours for 
different types of contingencies?  How much time must be given to the contractor to set 
up a suitable facility in a given environment with X capabilities?  Determining these 
requirements involves a complicated analysis, but it is critical to maximize operational 
supportability.  We propose that the USMC use the matrix used by the UK MOD 
(Appendix F) for planning purposes.  While their requirements are no doubt different 
than those of the USMC, there are many similarities. 
b. Integrated Logistic Support Plan 
Because the bulk of the USMC engineer equipment is commercially 
available and supportable throughout the world, this study proposes that logistics support 
be outsourced to the contractor.  There are questions that would need to be addressed.  
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Would the contractors be forced to use their own support infrastructure or would they 
have access to DOD systems?  Can the USMC use MIMMS or other systems?  The 
commercial sector already has integrated logistics support plans for their operations 
throughout the world.  Does the USMC want to rely on the contractors system or on its 
own?  Does the USMC want visibility into the contractors system?   
c. Maintenance and Repair 
One of the assertions in this thesis is that the USMC should concentrate its 
maintenance efforts on FCM and leave NFCM to the contractor to be performed at a rear 
area facility.  This will allow the USMC logistics community to concentrate on its core 
engineer competencies (outlined in Chapter III).  Upgrading capabilities of existing 
maintenance contact teams can allow them to easily perform FCM.  Private sector 
maintenance contact teams already have this capability.   
d. Materiel Flow Management 
The flow of assets and equipment into an operational area can be both 
costly and limiting, depending on infrastructure and availability of lift.  It must be 
determined whether a contractor will use their own transportation assets or if they will 
have access or need for government assets such as Airlift Mobility Command (AMC) or 
Traffic Management Office (TMO).  Will the contractor be responsible for delivery to the 
POD or APOD or just the POE or APOE?  If they use government assets, will they pay 
government rates or equivalent commercial rates?  In addition, depending on the urgency 
of the support required, will the government need to be prepared to pay a premium in 
wartime or contingency operations, and if so at what rate?     
e. Spares 
If the USMC sources out its engineer requirements through a PFI it would 
also have to decide whether it wants to outsource spare part support as well.  Currently, it 
uses the established supply system where it obtains Class IX repair parts through DLA or 
GSA.  One of the primary reasons for commercial support for the USMC engineer 
requirements is that cost savings can be achieved through the use of commercial sources.  
Likewise, it is possible to obtain cost savings by using commercial spare part support 
rather than maintaining a large government infrastructure to do the same.  Commercial 
companies can already support spare parts requirements for their equipment throughout 
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the world.  It would seem appropriate then to use existing commercial supply sources to 
meet USMC spare parts requirements because additional cost savings can be achieved. 
f. Technical/Proprietary Documents 
The length of PFI contracts signed by the UK MOD has run upwards of 30 
years108 depending on the capital investment undertaken by the private sector.  Even with 
reevaluations every couple of years, PFI’s can commits both the government and the 
contractor to a long-term commitment that is not easily modified or terminated.  Any 
actions undertaken by either party can have an impact on the other.  For this reason, it is 
important that the government both know and understand any company actions in terms 
of new developments or changes in business plans.  The government must also ensure 
that the information is protected from disclosure. 
g. Training: General  
As part of the PFI solution proposed, the government can also turn over 
responsibility of training military engineer equipment operators and mechanics to a 
private contractor.  The contractor would have responsibility for training operators on all 
equipment types to a given standard of proficiency, and be responsible for training 
operators and mechanics to perform their respective FCM.  The contractor would have to 
run a number of courses annually depending on needs for both mechanics and operators, 
as determined by USMC Manpower branch.  The contractor can also be responsible for 
conducting refresher training to ensure that proficiency levels are maintained.   
To be a viable part of this PFI, the contractor would be required to 
demonstrate that it could perform these functions cheaper than the current in house 
option.  This can save the USMC both costs and billets that it can then dedicate to the 
operating forces. 
h. Training & Equipment Records 
In a PFI arrangement, the contractor would be required to maintain all 
records for equipment maintenance and for personnel training.  All of this data must be 
available to the USMC so that it can independently track the state of readiness of the 
equipment and the skill level of its personnel. 
                                                 
108 United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, “PFI Guidelines: Procurement Issues Contractual.” 
http://www.mod.uk/business/ppp/guidelines/contractual.htm, November 2003 
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i. Safety 
Material Handling Equipment (MHE) and engineer equipment operation 
are a leading cause of accidents that result in serious injury or death within the United 
States USMC109.  To respond to this increasing trend the USMC has implemented a 
stringent safety program.  As part of the PFI, the USMC would have to require that a 
contractor maintain a similar safety program.   
3. Management Information System (MIS) 
Information management is a key to the success of a complicated PFI such as this.  
Proper information management will allow for real time access to information that can be 
used to solve issues before they become a problem.  Real time access can facilitate 
effective planning of engineer support to the MAGTF.  The following topics are issues 
that must be addressed as an integral part of the proposed PFI.   
a. MIS Structure and Design 
It is well known the USMC has a hard time tracking the current engineer 
equipment fleet in terms of its current condition, hours of use, or wear and tear on 
individual equipment.  In fact, the USMC has no visibility on the particulars about any 
piece of equipment.  The current maintenance management system, MIMMS, is not up to 
the task, nor are other systems such as ATLASS.  A firm requirement for this PFI would 
be for the contractor to propose an MIS that could do all of the above.  This could be an 
existing commercial system to reduce costs.  Companies like Caterpillar already do this 
for all of their equipment throughout the world. 
b. Transition and End-State Phases 
Because of the size of the USMC engineer equipment fleet it would 
probably be impractical to make a quick transition to a new system.  It would be part of 
the PFI requirements to have a potential contractor develop a proposed implementation 
plan to transfer the USMC to their MIS.  The contractors must have maximum flexibility 
to design such a system.  A system demonstration would also be required to ensure that 
there are no flaws in the system or process.  
 
                                                 




c. Information Access 
It is important for the government to have access to any MIS that supports 
the PFI.  Access will not only allow the government to ensure that their interests are 
being served, but also assist in the operational planning effort.   
d. Data Entry/Interfaces 
What ever MIS is implemented government personnel must be allowed to 
enter data and process it to support requisitions and decision making.  To this end, the 
entry of data must be available to contact teams operating in the field. 
e. Data Ownership 
If the contractor owns the data, does the military have the right to oversee 
it and use it for its own purposes?  The government should have such a right, as it is a 
way to measure effectiveness and asset costs. 
f. Software Support  
Potential contractors must also present a plan addressing the supportability 
of the MIS.  Will this be the contractor’s responsibility or will the task be subcontracted 
out?  Will the system be upgradeable?   
4. Change/Contract Management 
As already mentioned, a PFI can be a very long commitment for both the private 
sector and the government.  All requirements, obligations, or potential eventualities that 
can occur during the life of the contract can be written into the final negotiated 
agreement.  The UK experience with PFI’s shows the need to make adjustment in the 
future and that the success of these adjustments depends on the flexibility of the process.  
This concept is not unknown to the DOD, who has experience the effects of changing 
requirements on most of its major programs.  For this reason, the USMC needs two 
things in relation to the management aspects of a PFI.   
First, the PFI needs to be flexible enough to allow both parties to make changes 
with reasonable effort.  It is impractical to expect that all potential requirements during 
the life of a PFI can be addressed in a contract.  The PFI must have a built in mechanism 
that allows for relatively rapid changes especially with provisions for changes during 
time of war.   
57
Second, the USMC must create a management team that can be dedicated to the 
PFI management over the life of the contract.  This will preserve continuity and corporate 
knowledge, which are critical to the success of the effort.  The UK MOD has made this a 
requirement for their PFI’s.  
 
E. CONCLUSION 
 This chapter has outlined how a proposed PFI could be structure to support 
USMC engineer equipment needs and how the Marine Corps should restructure is CSS 
and logistics functions to concentrate on its core competencies.  In addition, a series of 
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V.    FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The intent of this thesis was to determine if the UK MOD PFI for their Category 
C vehicles is a feasible alternative for the USMC to meet its engineer requirements.  If so, 
then also outline the requirements and considerations that need to be considered for 
implementation.  An analysis was conducted of what a PFI is, how it is structured and 
how it operates, plus the lessons learned that UK MOD has had with them over the last 
decade.  This included an analysis of contacts and trends within the private sector.  Then, 
an analysis of the USMC current engineer equipment structure, organization, processes, 
and requirements was conducted to determine what would need to be addressed in a PFI 
type arrangement.  Finally, based on the analysis in Chapters II and III, a PFI was drafted 
that would meet all USMC engineer equipment requirements.  How this proposed PFI 
would work was explained.  In addition all of the particular requirements that the Marine 
Corps would need to address as well as an implementation plan were identified.  This 
chapter states the findings, recommendations, and conclusions to MARCORSYSCOM. 
 
B. FINDINGS 
1. There is interest in the commercial sector to meet government engineer equipment 
requirements through such arrangements as leasing, renting, or PPP. 
2. Companies in the private sector can meet engineer equipment needs throughout the 
world.  Complimenting private sector capabilities with DOD logistics support can 
enhance world wide supportability. 
3. The UK MOD has is currently considering a PFI arrangement that meets its 
requirements.  Its needs in terms of capabilities and equipment requirements are very 
similar to those of the USMC.  Also, the UK MOD engineer equipment fleet is about 
the same size as those of the USMC. 
4. UK Government has experienced positive results overall with the PFI type 
arrangements that they have set up over the past fifteen years.  PFI’s have been used 
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to meet a variety of public sector requirements.  In addition, they have extensive 
knowledge on the implementation process for PFI arrangements. 
5. PFI contractual arrangements are highly flexible and can be adjusted to meet a variety 
of requirements. 
6. PFI’s are long-term arrangements and there must be a means to make adjustments 
once it is implemented because it is impossible to make provisions for all potential 
occurrences. 
7. Renting engineer equipment has become the primary method for large organizations 
in the private sector to meet their engineer equipment requirements.  The largest 
customers for engineer equipment manufacturers are rental companies. 
8. The entire DOD logistics process involves a multitude of stakeholders, all of whom 
can have a significant effect on any proposed change to the process.  The UK MOD 
found that dealing with the plurality of stakeholders within its own system was a 
major reason of why it took four year to reach the current decision point. 
9. Current USMC requirements documents for engineer equipment date back to the 
1970’s and don’t properly address current requirements. 
10. USMC MIS doesn’t allow for proper tracking of individual engineer equipment 
usage, operations and maintenance costs, nor life cycle management.  It is therefore 
difficult to obtain accurate cost data to support an outsourcing study. 
11. The USMC uses only a small percentage of its engineer equipment on a day to day 
basis while the rest of the equipment sits mostly idle resulting in considerable 
underutilization compared to commercial sector usage rates. 
 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Assemble an IPT to conduct a business case analysis of using a PFI arrangement to 
meet USMC engineer equipment needs.  The business case would need to include a 
cost benefit analysis that could determine if this option is advantageous. 
2. Send a team to the UK MOD & C Category IPT to evaluate their process of dealing 
with the engineer PFI over the last four years.  The process that the UK MOD has 
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followed has been lengthy and required many adjustments to bring it to the point of 
making a decision.  A great deal can be learned from their experience.  There is 
excellent potential to learn valuable lessons that can save a great deal of time and 
effort. This action would require a government-to-government request. 
3. Request that the Caterpillar Corporation Government Liaison Office debrief their 
experience with the UK MOD PFI.  There is considerable knowledge from an 
industry perspective that can be learned from such an exchange.  A PFI is a long-term 
contract that must work for both the government and the contractor.  It is important to 
obtain private industry perspective. 
4. Conduct an industry day in which the private sector would be invited to present their 
ideas and concepts for meeting engineer equipment requirements.  It is important to 
provide the private sector maximum flexibility in how to meet our requirements.  This 
would allow for the greatest amount of innovation.   
5. Start a PFI arrangement on a small scale and build up from there.  Choose perhaps 
just one type of equipment such as a D7 Dozer and just a CONUS test bed.  A limited 
test can make it easier to analyze the effectiveness of a PFI solution as well as provide 
a learning opportunity that will allow the process or requirements to be adjusted more 
easily.  In addition, a limited test would be easier to implement, as it would affect less 
stakeholders. 
6. Address PPP in the FAR/DFAR.  The FAR/DFAR currently doesn’t specifically 
address issues involving PPP’s, and it puts limits on leasing when it comes to 
government contracting.  Recent government regulations have opened the door to 
additional outsourcing options to include a shifting view of what are inherently 
governmental functions.  It is time for the FAR and DFAR to provide guidance on 
PPP possibilities in a manner that encourages the services to find innovative 
solutions.  
7. Manage PFI/PPP at the DOD level110.  There is no doubt that all of the services have 
engineer equipment to support their day to day operations and contingency 
                                                 
110 United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, “PFI Guidelines: Procurement Issues General.” 
www.mod.uk/business/ppp/guidelines/general, November 2003  
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requirement.  There is also considerable redundancy in the equipment, where it is 
stored, support infrastructure, amount maintained for war reserve and contingency 
purposes.  The UK MOD found it beneficial to seek to outsource engineer equipment 
requirements for all of the services in one package.  From a DOD perspective there 
could be considerable cost savings achieved by coordinating the different engineer 
equipment requirement across the services. While this study did not look at this 
possibility, it is an area where further analysis can be useful.  This idea can be applied 
to more than just engineer equipment. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
This research has demonstrated that the USMC is not efficiently managing nor 
operating its engineer equipment.  At the same time, it has been demonstrated that a PFI 
is a viable alternative, as a PPP arrangement to meet USMC engineer equipment needs.  
The research has explained how a PFI can work to meet USMC engineer equipment 
requirements as well as address all of the relevant requirements for successfully 
implementing it.  It is recommended that the USMC establish an IPT to determine if this 












APPENDIX A: SOURCES FOR IMPROVED VALUE FOR MONEY111 
• Ensure that assets are fully fit for purpose but no more, that is removing any tendency 
to over-design or gold-plate and removing the cost pressure from post contract design 
changes. 
• Closely integrating design with operational needs so that the assets can be operated 
and maintained with maximum efficiency. 
• Increasing the efficiency of both construction and operation by applying existing 
expertise. 
• Making use of new technology and/or new, more effective business processes. 
• Achieving economies of scale by enlarging the asset and sharing its use between the 
public sector and other customers (or between two or more public sector customers). 
• Designing the asset to provide scope for other services to be sold to third party users. 
• Designing the asset to improve its resale value or its capacity to be transferred to new 
users after the end of the contract. 
• Making easier the introduction of user charges where appropriate as a means of 























                                                 
111 Chancellor of the Exchequer, Private Opportunity, Public Benefit: Progressing the Private 
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APPENDIX B: HER MAJESTY’S TREASURY (HMT) PAYMASTER 
RECOMMENDATIONS112 
1. PFI deals already signed, or accepted as operationally and financially viable, will 
proceed without delay. 
2.  Every potential partnership project will be subject to a more rigorous appraisal early in 
its life, so contractors, funders and operators do not squander time and resources on 
projects which are unlikely to work and the public sector avoids wish list' schemes. 
3.  We will draw up guidance on tendering for partnership projects, in consultation with 
the National Audit Office, the Audit Commission and the Accounts Commission for 
Scotland. 
4.  Where possible, we will set a timetable for each project's tendering process to give 
potential private partners an indication of when a decision can be expected on a project.  
5. We will urgently review the existing legislative framework, issue guidance and, where 
appropriate, enact new legislation to ensure that public bodies have the necessary legal 
power to enter into contracts. 
6.  We will ensure that the guidance on risk transfer and value for money, including 
templates, is kept up to date, in consultation with public and private sector interests. 
7.  In particular, we will seek to develop a clear and consistent policy on generic risks - 
for example, the approach to changes in Government health and safety policy or the 
treatment of contaminated land. 
8.  We will encourage a wide range of partnership deals, including public/private joint 
ventures, such as Manchester's Metrolink tram system, and non-profit trusts, such as 
those providing old people's homes formerly run by local authorities. 
9.  The Private Finance Panel will be strengthened and given a specific remit to 
streamline procedures, develop standard forms of contract and cut red tape. 
                                                 
112 Her Majesty’s Treasury, “PAYMASTER GENERAL ANNOUNCES KICK-
START TO PFI (PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS) Review of Private Finance 





10.  With the assistance of the Private Finance Panel and 4Ps - the partnership company 
set up by the Local Authority Association with support from the Department of 
Environment - we will encourage the rapid dissemination of best practice throughout 
Whitehall and the regions. 
11.  We will require Government, especially at local level, to involve small business in 
partnership deals where possible. 
12.  We will maintain prudent control on public sector revenue commitments to 
partnership deals and public sector liabilities in joint ventures, following consultation 
with the relevant public bodies. 
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113 UK MOD, “PFI Guidelines:  The Phases of a PFI Project – Feasibility.” 
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APPENDIX E: ENGINEER MOS BREAKDOWN115 
MOS   DESCRIPTION   
1301   Basic Engineer, Construction, and Equipment Officer I 
1302   Engineer Officer I 
1310   Engineer Equipment Officer II, III 
1330   Facilities Management Officer 
1390   Bulk Fuel Officer III 
1300   Basic Engineer, Construction, and Equipment Marine  
1316   Metal Worker  
1341   Engineer Equipment Mechanic  
1342   Small Craft Mechanic  
1345   Engineer Equipment Operator  
1349   Engineer Equipment Chief  
1361   Engineer Assistant  
1371   Combat Engineer  
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Assisted and contractor maintenance 
 Scheduled 
 




spares within 3 
working days 
Provision of 
spares within 12 
hrs 
Rectification. 48-hour 
response time with repair 
complete or machine 
replaced within 72 hours 
of report 
Rectification. 3-hour 
response time with repair 
complete or machine 





spares within 3 
working days 
Provision of 
spares within 24 
hrs 
Rectification. 48-hour 
response time with repair 
complete or machine 
replaced within 72 hours 
of report 
Rectification. 12-hour 
response time with repair 
complete or machine 





spares within 3 
working days 
Provision of 
spares within 3 
working days 
Rectification. 48-hour 
response time with repair 
complete or machine 
replaced within 72 hours 
of report 
Rectification. 48-hour 
response time with repair 
complete or machine 
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